Diversification Strategies and Contributions of Coffee Income to Poverty Alleviation Among Smallholders in Northern Huehuetenango and Quiche Departments, Guatemala by Gerlicz, Andrew
University of Vermont
ScholarWorks @ UVM
Graduate College Dissertations and Theses Dissertations and Theses
2016




Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.uvm.edu/graddis
Part of the Agricultural Economics Commons, and the Sociology Commons
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Dissertations and Theses at ScholarWorks @ UVM. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Graduate College Dissertations and Theses by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks @ UVM. For more information, please contact
donna.omalley@uvm.edu.
Recommended Citation




DIVERSIFICATION STRATEGIES AND CONTRIBUTIONS OF COFFEE 
INCOME TO POVERTY ALLEVIATION AMONG SMALLHOLDERS IN 










The Faculty of the Graduate College 
of 




In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements 
for the Degree of Master of Science 







Defense Date: May 5, 2016 
Thesis Examination Committee: 
 
David Conner, Ph.D., Advisor 
Ernesto Méndez, Ph. D., Chairperson 
Daniel Baker, Ph. D. 
Cynthia J. Forehand, Ph.D., Dean of the Graduate College
 ABSTRACT 
 
In the past two decades, Mesoamerican smallholder coffee farmers have had to 
confront several stressors and shocks, such as price crises and natural disasters, with 
debilitating impacts on the viability of their livelihoods. More recently, many farmers 
have suffered crop losses in the wake of the spread of coffee leaf rust disease, and 
researchers are predicting that some areas will become less suitable for coffee growing 
in the near future as a result of climate change. In response to these conditions and in the 
context of the withdrawal of the state from provision of agricultural services, 
development practitioners have mainly pursued a strategy of helping farmers gain access 
to specialty markets, including those purchasing coffee from farmers with organic and 
Fair Trade certifications. They have also promoted farmer organization into marketing 
cooperatives, which have in turn provided various services to their members, including 
credit and technical assistance. However, there are doubts as to whether these schemes 
are sufficient in increasing and stabilizing smallholder incomes, and some have predicted 
declining returns from these strategies in the future.  
 
For these reasons, many have called for the promotion of livelihood 
diversification as an additional component of rural development programs. This thesis 
studies both the shortfalls in coffee incomes compared to poverty lines and the current 
uses and perceptions of different diversification activities. In the first study, the shortfalls 
are calculated through construction of individual and average enterprise budgets based 
on grower records and interviews with four organic and organized growers and three 
conventional growers. It concludes that while some growers have coffee incomes 
approaching that poverty line, they are all currently below the line. There is wide 
variation within both groups.  
 
The second study uses content analysis of transcripts from 15 interviews with 
members of a regional coffee cooperative, Asociación Barillense de Agricultores 
(ASOBAGRI), based on four different interview guides. It concludes that coffee remains 
the primary livelihood strategy of the respondents, whereas most other activities offer 
relatively small contributions to incomes, with the exception of honey and a small sewing 
shop, and some reflect coping rather than risk management. The study also identified 
other themes mediating diversification, including income-smoothing, optimization, 















First, I would like to thank the producers and the staff at ASOBAGRI, and my friend and 
research partner, Dana Christel.  
 
I would like to thank the Agroecology and Rural Livelihoods Group, and in particular, 
Martha Caswell, for their support and for the opportunity. 
 
I want to also thank Deandra Perruccio, Deborah Krug and Emily Stengel, who pushed 
me kicking and screaming through to completing this thesis, as well as the rest of the 
community of graduate students that has made these past few years so enjoyable. 
 
Finally, a thank you to my committee members, who have not only offered advising on 













TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ................................................................................................ ii 
LIST OF TABLES .............................................................................................................. v 
LIST OF FIGURES ........................................................................................................... vi 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................... 1 
CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW ............................................................................ 6 
2.1. Thesis Organization ............................................................................................... 13 
CHAPTER 3: USE AND PERCEPTIONS OF ALTERNATIVE ECONOMIC 
ACTIVITIES AMONG SMALLHOLDER COFFEE FARMERS IN 
HUEHUETENANGO AND QUICHÉ, GUATEMALA .................................................. 16 
3.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................. 16 
3.2 Literature Review .................................................................................................... 16 
3.3 Materials and Methods ............................................................................................ 24 
3.4 Results ..................................................................................................................... 27 
3.4.1. Themes Mediating Diversification .................................................................. 40 
3.5. Discussion .............................................................................................................. 47 
3.5.1. Limitations ....................................................................................................... 58 
CHAPTER 4: ORGANIC AND CONVENTIONAL SMALLHOLDER COFFEE 
PRODUCTION COSTS AND NET INCOME AND COMPARISON TO POVERTY 
THRESHOLDS IN THE COMMUNITY OF NUEVA ESPERANZA, 
HUEHUETENANGO, GUATEMALA ........................................................................... 61 
4.1. Introduction ............................................................................................................ 61 
4.2. Literature Review ................................................................................................... 62 
4.3. Material and Methods............................................................................................. 72 
4.4. Results .................................................................................................................... 78 
4.5. Discussion .............................................................................................................. 93 
4.5.1. Limitations ....................................................................................................... 97 
CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSIONS ....................................................................................... 98 
 iv 
 
CHAPTER 6: LESSONS LEARNED ............................................................................ 114 
BIBLIOGRAPHY ........................................................................................................... 118 
APPENDIX A: Interview Guide No. 1 ........................................................................... 125 
APPENDIX B: Interview Guide No. 2 ........................................................................... 126 
APPENDIX C: Interview Guide No. 3 ........................................................................... 127 
APPENDIX D: Grower Histories ................................................................................... 129 
APPENDIX E: Organic and Conventional Smallholder Practices ................................. 130 
























LIST OF TABLES 
 
Table Page 
3.1.  List of factors that encourages or discourage diversification based on  
 previous research ................................................................................................. 22 
3.2.  Distribution of respondents by community and gender ....................................... 29 
3.3.  Economic activities and number of households deriving cash incomes  
from them ............................................................................................................. 29 
4.1.  Coffee production cost categories ........................................................................ 75 
4.2.  Orchard establishment costs from OG3 ............................................................... 76 
4.3.  Characteristics of coffee plots studied ................................................................. 79 
4.4.   Productivity in pounds per hectare (and total yields) for organic growers .......... 82 
4.5.   Two-year average orchard maintenance costs per hectare .................................. 86 
4.6.   Wages paid by growers ........................................................................................ 86 
4.7.   Products used by conventional smallholder coffee growers in this study ........... 89 
4.8.   Average and specific effective wages .................................................................. 90 
4.9.   Per-hectare revenues, costs of production and profits ......................................... 87 
4.10. Comparison of per-hectare and actual household coffee incomes to  
poverty metrics, and changes in landholding, price and productivity  













3.1.  Conceptual map of factors that influence diversification strategies  
 within the Sustainable Livelihoods Framework .........................................................23 
3.2. Location of communities where research was conducted...........................................27 
3.3. Location of communities where research was conducted (detail) ..............................28 
3.4. Distribution of respondents according to number of sources of cash  
income ........................................................................................................................30 
3.5.  Conceptual map of factors that influence diversification strategies  
 within the Sustainable Livelihoods Framework, including factors  
 highlighted by this study ............................................................................................48 
4.1. Farmer record showing ratio of cherry yield weight to parchment coffee 
weight .........................................................................................................................77 
4.2. Productivity trends for organic growers .....................................................................82 
4.3. Yield trends for organic and conventional growers over five seasons .......................83 
4.4. Comparison between ASOBAGRI’s final prices and ICO’s Average  
“Prices to Growers” in Guatemala .............................................................................84 
4.5. Comparison between cooperative prices and a local intermediary’s prices  
over five years ............................................................................................................85 
4.6. Comparison of coffee net incomes to international and national poverty  
 thresholds ....................................................................................................................92 
4.7. Comparison between organic coffee yields in literature and this study .....................95 









CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
 In general, smallholder coffee farmers face falling real prices and rising 
production costs (Bacon, Méndez, & Flores Gómez, 2008). They also must cope with 
price volatility and occasional price crises; more recently, with the spread of coffee leaf 
rust; and potentially with declining yields due to climate change (Schroth et al., 2009). 
Land degradation (i.e. social erosion) and remoteness from economic centers (and so 
economic marginalization) are also a common problem in highland and hillside farming 
worldwide (Pender, 2004). As a result, many smallholder coffee farmers suffer 
devastating impacts on food security and investments in education (Baca, et al., 2014; 
Bacon, et al., 2008).  
 In addition to providing a key asset to these households, coffee agroecosystems 
have been promoted for their environmental sustainability, in contrast with alternative 
land uses such as maize production, pasture and logging. Coffee agroecosystems 
conserve critical ecosystem goods and services ( Bray et al., 2008). These stressors could 
lead the way to less environmentally sustainable (i.e. non-shaded) coffee systems (Gobbi, 
2000), a trend that was very common in northern Latin America in 1990s (Rice & Ward, 
1996) or abandonment of agroforestry for other land uses (ex. extensification of corn 
production, pasture, logging, etc.). 
 Since the coffee crisis in the early 2000s, when market prices fell to one of the 
lowest points in history, development efforts targeting smallholder farmers have focused 
on access to specialty markets, such as organic and Fair Trade, as well as on farmer 
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organization into growers’ cooperatives, which can aggregate local supply and 
presumably negotiate for higher prices (Bacon, Mendez, & Flores Gómez, 2008). 
Participating in such markets requires farmers to be certified and to meet standards for 
production and quality. As Valkila (2009, p. 3019) notes of Nicaraguan smallholders, 
without participation in cooperatives and support from development agencies, “it would 
be practically impossible for small-scale coffee famers to acquire organic certification 
due to the high cost of certifying individual small farmers in Nicaragua and the non-
existence of organic trade channels for small producers outside the cooperative 
membership.”  
 Besides attaining price premiums for growers, cooperatives can support growers 
with credit access, technical and legal assistance, increased political efficacy, and 
occasionally through transfers for education, healthcare and housing expenses (Bacon et 
al., 2008). Bacon et al. (2008) showed that members of coffee Fair Trade cooperatives 
were more likely to invest in their farms and houses than non-members. 
 Méndez et al. (2010), however, has shown that certifications alone might be 
insufficient to reduce poverty among smallholder coffee farmers. Despite higher prices 
and revenues, coffee volumes were very low. And although certified growers in this 
study tended to have a higher incidence of savings, they were also more likely to face 
food shortages (Méndez et al., 2010). In some cases, certified growers are not able to sell 
their entire yield at premium prices (Bacon, 2005), either because demand is too small or 
because they cannot wait for later payments of premiums. 
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 One recurring issue with certified markets is that prices do not necessarily rise 
proportionately with rising costs of production, and changing international policies 
regarding premiums depends on the political will and coordination of organized 
smallholders (Bacon et al., 2008). More recently, new certified markets have arisen that 
offer lower benefits for smallholders than traditional specialty markets, while at the same 
time competing for a similar consumer market (Bacon et al., 2008).  
 Even when certified producers earn more than their counterparts, they might not 
earn enough to make meaningful investments in their farms, since premiums are absorbed 
into basic household expenses (Valkila, 2009). The certifications might also have a 
differentiated effect depending on the socioeconomic status of the household. While the 
poorest farmers might be able to build assets through access to certified markets, they 
might benefit far less than more well-endowed farmers in absolute terms (Donovan & 
Poole, 2014).  
 Considering that certifications and participation in cooperatives might not be 
sufficient to maintain smallholder viability, livelihood diversification could help to cover 
the persistent shortfalls in coffee income. This thesis seeks to understand the use and 
perceptions related to diversification strategies among a group of smallholder coffee 
farmers. It also attempts to define the size of the shortfall in coffee income over the 
course of two years (2014 – 2015), from which the need for additional source of income 




1.1. Context of Study Area 
 
This study was conducted in the northern area of Huehuetenango and Quiché 
Departments, which overlay Guatemala’s Western Highlands. In the Western Highlands, 
the poverty rate is as high as 76 percent (27 percent of the population lives in extreme 
poverty) and more than half of the children under five are malnourished. The majority of 
the population in this region is indigenous Maya. This region was the site of the worst 
atrocities during the armed conflict between the Guatemalan government and guerrilla 
fighters, which lasted from 1960 to 1996. Despite the implementation of peace accords, 
the region continues to be the victim of political and economic discrimination (USAID, 
2014). 
 






1.2. Asociación Barillense de Agricultores 
 
 The following research was conducted with unflagging logistical support from the 
administration, extension agents and members of the Asociación Barillense de 
Agricultores (ASOBAGRI) and the family of Herman Donato Samayoa. ASOBAGRI 
was founded in 1989. Between 1989 and 1995, ASOBAGRI sold most of its coffee to 
another cooperative, FEDECOAG. But by 1995, the cooperative had become heavily 
indebted. Between 1995 and 1999, ASOBAGRI received considerable support from 
CECI (Centre d’étude et de coopération international), a Canadian not-for-profit 
organization, particularly in building administrative capacity, and in 1999, ASOBAGRI 
exported its first container of coffee directly to a coffee broker in the United States. This 
broker remains ASOBAGRI’s main buyer to this day.  
 In 2011, ASOBAGRI lost its main receiving and storage facilities to a landslide in 
Barillas, but as a demonstration of the organization’s capacity and resilience, it 
rebounded, constructed a new warehouse and has continued to grow its membership. At 
the time of this writing, ASOBAGRI had grown to 1,238 active members (990 men and 
248 women) located in 86 rural communities in the departments of Huehuetenango and 








CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 To determine whether or not diversification is warranted, and to examine the 
ways diversification have been incorporated into and contributed to the welfare of rural 
households, it is first necessary to provide some clarity on the operational concepts, 
particularly on “livelihoods” and “livelihood diversification.” In this case, we use the 
Chambers and Conway (1992) definition that “a livelihood comprises the capabilities, 
assets (including both material and social resources) and activities required for a means 
of living” (as cited in Scoones, 1998). 
 Livelihood diversification can be defined as “the process by which rural families 
construct a diverse portfolio of activities and social support capabilities in order to 
survive and to improve their standards of living” (Ellis, 1998). Although diversification 
has been viewed as a transitional phase through which rural households pass as they are 
leaving farming occupations for good, it is increasingly being seen as a phenomena of 
microeconomic equilibrium, where farming families use alternative sources of income 
and non-income support in order to maintain their rural livelihoods. Nevertheless, it has 
been difficult to ascertain whether livelihood diversification has increased among 
smallholders or is simply “increasingly recognized” (Carswell, 2002; Ellis, 1998). 
 Both these understandings would appear to shine a positive light on 
diversification, but the meaning of diversification is not quite so unproblematic. As Ellis 
(1998) outlines, diversification could either be deliberate or involuntary and could 
ameliorate or exacerbate local inequalities by providing a “safety valve for the rural 
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poor” or “a means of accumulation for the rural rich.” It could also buoy or undermine 
agricultural growth, which according to some theories is still the foundation of 
widespread rural development (Ellis, 1998). Off-farm work, for instance, could enable 
households to overcome entry barriers into more lucrative forms of agriculture or the 
high costs associated with inputs (Ayuya et al., 2015), whereas, on the other hand, it 
could lead to the re-allocation of resources away from agricultural production, thereby 
lowering overall productivity. 
 Other epistemological challenges in defining diversification include decisions 
about how to categorize (and sub-categorize) income sources; about the unit of analysis 
(typically, the household is used, but choosing who counts as a contributing member of 
the household is not always straightforward)1; and about whether typologies of 
diversification models drawn from the data can reflect the complexities of rural realities. 
Evaluating the outcomes of livelihood diversification on well-being is also burdened by 
the fact that income is not always an appropriate proxy for rural welfare, since 
agricultural incomes vary annually and seasonally, and can be difficult to measure 
because of recall issues and missing cost data (Ellis, 1998). As Pender (2004) recognizes, 
Ellis’ definition of livelihood strategies is narrow since it tends to focus on cash and in-
kind (i.e. subsistence) income. Although broader concepts of livelihoods and livelihood 
                                                 
1 In Pender (2004), villages were used as the unit of analysis in investigating development pathways and 
their impact on natural resource management; the author was mainly concerned with village-level 
comparative advantages, such as agro-ecological conditions, market access and infrastructure, and 




strategies have been put forward, these are “difficult to operationalize or use to test 
relationships between livelihood strategies and other concepts, such as natural resource 
management.” Ideally, these income measures are combined with qualitative assessments 
of poverty (Scoones, 1998). 
 There can be compelling economic reasons for diversification, although social 
and political institutions also play a role in mediating these processes. In general, 
diversification research has focused on household rational decision-making, particularly 
in the context of the withdrawal of government support of rural, smallholder livelihoods 
as part of liberalization policies. This has led to theories of diversification based around 
“seasonality, differentiated labour markets, risk strategies, coping behavior, credit market 
imperfections, and intertemporal savings and investment strategies” (Ellis, 1998).  
 Risk management has possibly received the most attention. It is worth mentioning 
a few considerations regarding risk management. First, risk management could lower a 
household’s overall income for the goal of achieving income stability or security. Second, 
effective risk management depends on incorporating income sources with low covariate 
(i.e. not exposed to the same) risk. This is a challenge for rural families whose diversity 
often involves different crops or agricultural labor. Finally, risk management can be 
confused for coping tactics. Whereas diversification-as-risk management suggests careful 
planning, diversification-as-coping refers to involuntary actions to maintain consumption 
levels in the face of crisis, and such actions could undermine future welfare and viability 
especially if they involve the sale of critical assets. This distinction is especially relevant 
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to frameworks that conceive of rural poverty as not only a matter of insufficiency, but 
also as a matter of extreme vulnerability to shocks and stressors.  
 The Sustainable Livelihoods Framework contributes two important improvements 
over traditional conceptions of rural poverty that are relevant to the following studies. 
First, livelihoods are conceived as multi-faceted and relying on a diverse array of assets 
(or capitals) and often employing a diverse array of activities. That is to say, cash income 
is an important asset, but it is not the only asset used by households to sustain themselves. 
This is important because interventions that seek to improve cash incomes to the 
detriment of other types of assets could do more harm than good, especially if it increases 
the vulnerability of livelihoods. In addition, cash income is not an adequate definition of 
the outcomes of assets and strategies (i.e. well-being), but instead well-being is 
understood to encompass more subjective notions of capability and meaning (Scoones, 
1998). 
 Second, the framework emphasizes the vulnerable nature of rural livelihoods as a 
condition that constrains poverty reduction, so that livelihood viability refers not only to 
attainment of certain income thresholds, but also the ability to “cope with and recover 
from stresses and shocks, maintain or enhance its capabilities and assets, while not 
undermining the natural resource base” (Chambers and Conway, 1992, as cited in 
Scoones, 1998).  
 This framework represents a different lens to view agricultural development than 
that used by scholars who view agriculture as a subordinate sector in growing national 
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economies, the main role of agricultural development being to supply cheap food and 
cheap labor to the industrial and urban sectors. Others have argued that it is not necessary 
to improve agricultural productivity to drive economic growth, but that investments 
should be made in other sectors, while demand for food is covered by increasing 
openness to imports (see a review of these theories in Dethier & Effenberger (2012)).  
 In general, the Livelihoods framework is less concerned with economic growth 
per-se, but instead it focuses on livelihoods outcomes, so that even theories about the 
importance of agriculture to economic growth through production and consumption 
linkages are less relevant here, since they tend to focus on how agriculture serves as an 
“initiator of industrialization.” It is also possible that agricultural development can still 
reduce poverty, without necessarily leading to significant economic growth (World 
Development Report 2008, as cited in Dethier & Effenberger (2012). 
 Using the Livelihoods framework to study diversification allows us to understand 
the extent to which a diversification strategy improves (and secures) or, on the other 
hand, undermines well-being by the way in which it draws on the various types of assets 
and fulfills the various types of outcomes demanded by rural life. Risk and seasonality is 
are especially important points of convergence between the concept of “livelihood 
diversification” and the Livelihoods framework. 
 However, some authors have critiqued the Livelihoods framework, arguing that 
most work is anecdotal and uses only descriptive information (Pender, 2004). Others 
have suggested that it de-emphasizes agriculture to draw attention to other assets and 
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capabilities, precluding a deeper analysis of potential farm models that agroecologists are 
able to identify (Amekawa, 2011). Indeed, the Livelihoods framework was at least partly 
born of a critique of agriculture-centric rural development. Awekawa (2011) argues that 
Livelihoods frameworks should be incorporated with agroecological frameworks that 
continue to emphasize the potential for sustainable farming, which itself serves multiple 
functions in satisfying livelihood goals (Amekawa, Sseguya, Onzere, & Carranza, 2010). 
 Besides, rural livelihoods are embedded in ecological systems, and so a 
livelihoods approach, on its own, might not be sufficient for addressing landscape-scale 
sustainability issues. Very little literature on livelihood diversification has “investigated 
the implications of livelihood diversification for natural resource management” (Pender, 
2004).  
In a rare example, Pender (2004) found that in Honduran villages associated with 
horticultural, non-farm employment and coffee expansion development pathways, 
deforestation and de-vegetation of steep slopes was reduced over areas that continued to 
rely mainly on basic grains, leading the author to conclude that these changes could be a 
“win-win” solutions both in terms of livelihoods and the natural resource base, although 
declining water availability and increased insecticide use were issues in the horticultural 
and non-farm employment pathways, respectively. The forestry pathway, on the other 
hand, did not offer the same improvements to wages as the other strategies mentioned. 
 Agroecology is an academic framework that has tied smallholder viability and 
resilience to the vibrancy and resilience of ecosystems. At its core, agroecology is a 
scientific discipline that strives to understand the interactions between agriculture and 
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ecosystems, namely the trade-offs between ecosystem goods and services and agricultural 
outputs (yield and incomes). However, even more than this, agroecologists tend to 
actively promote a normative vision of agriculture that is much more sensitive and 
integrated with natural ecosystems than the high-input, globalized agri-food systems that 
have developed in the modern era (Amekawa, 2011).  
 Agroecology is not only concerned with improving indicators for ecological 
sustainability, but also recognizes that transitions to (or conservation of) ideal 
agroecological systems must be amenable to the people currently farming and must take 
into consideration their needs and goals. This is both an ethical position, as well as an 
awareness that ecological sustainability relies on socio-economic sustainability (and vice 
versa). Here, agroecology bridges easily with disciplines that are more critical of 
prevailing power structures, such as political ecology. Since many current farmers are 
poor smallholders, this amounts to saying that agroecology seeks practices that enhance 
ecosystems while also reducing poverty and providing food security (Amekawa, 2011). 
 Regarding “livelihood diversification” as an economic and social activity, 
agroecology mainly concerns itself with the conservation of agrobiodiversity (Méndez, 
Bacon, Olson, Morris, & Shattuck, 2010; Méndez, 2008) or the persistence of subsistence 
production (Morris, Méndez, Lovell, & Olson, 2013). Although many authors 
acknowledge the use of non-farm income sources, as well participation in certain types of 
social organization (Méndez, et al., 2010), there have fallen short of incorporating them 
into a comprehensive analysis of livelihood sustainability, preferring instead to focus on 
agrobiodiversity. There is an opportunity, however, for agroecologists to use their 
 13 
 
framework to identify the connections between participation in non-farm employment, 
agricultural productivity and practices, and ecological vibrancy.  
 While agroecology attempts to fulfill economic and social outcomes, as well as 
ecological ones, Amekawa (2011) suggests that a major limitation of the agroecological 
approach to economic and social sustainability is that it focuses solely on returns from re-
organization and re-allocations within the sphere of agricultural or land management. The 
model used by agroecologists might fail to take into account that many small farmers 
support their livelihoods with non-agricultural assets. For instance, Barham (2010) found 
that among southern Mexican coffee income only made up 19 percent of mean incomes. 
Both subsidies and remittances made up greater income shares, at 20 percent and 35 
percent respectively. Non-agricultural activities also made up a substantial share at 17 
percent.     
2.1. Thesis Organization 
 
 This thesis comprises two studies that seek to address two gaps in the literature on 
the viability of smallholder coffee production and the strength of diversification strategies 
as sustainable development solutions for these producers. The literature on diversification 
among smallholder coffee producers relies heavily on assumptions drawn from 
quantitative survey data, which are not matched by an earnest qualitative exploration of 
economic alternatives. The first study seeks to understand the uses and perceptions of 




1. How are smallholder coffee producers diversifying, and what are these 
perceptions of these activities? 
2. What themes appear to be weighing on decisions to diversify in specific ways? 
A short introduction is followed by an equally brief discussion of previous research on 
the types of diversification employed by smallholder coffee farmers and the outcomes of 
these strategies. Then, I discuss the types of data used and the method of coding themes 
in order to produce both an understanding of the parameters of each option, as well as the 
factors that appear to be mediating their adoption. I conclude with a discussion on what 
this study might contribute to future research and development. 
 The literature is also limited by the scarcity of detailed analyses of coffee net 
incomes, even though these net incomes have broad implications for development 
interventions, including diversification supports. The second study offers a more detailed 
and current depiction of profitability levels and contributions of coffee income to the 
attainment of poverty thresholds. It also compares the performance of organic and 
organized producers in this regard with their conventional counterparts. The questions the 
guide this research are: 
1. What are the per-hectare and actual net incomes of organic and conventional 
smallholders? 




I review the literature to understand the methods, challenges and shortcomings of these 
types of research, as well as to develop hypotheses with regard to research questions. 
Then, I present the types of data used and the methods for compiling and analyzing 





CHAPTER 3: USE AND PERCEPTIONS OF ALTERNATIVE ECONOMIC 
ACTIVITIES AMONG SMALLHOLDER COFFEE FARMERS IN 




In light of the diverse shocks and stressors faced by Mesoamerican smallholder 
coffee farmers, livelihood diversification has been prescribed as a strategy that could 
contribute to outcomes such as poverty alleviation, food security and resilience (Bacon, 
Getz, Kraus, Montenegro, & Holland, 2012; Schroth et al., 2009).  
Considering that households are already diversified in many sites (Bacon, 2008), 
are advocates of livelihood diversification calling for additional income sources, targeted 
improvements to existing ones or more broad re-organization of household resources? It 
is possible that we are still in an exploratory phase with regard to how policy and 
practitioners can identify and promotes successful alternatives. 
 This purpose of this study was to collect and present results from qualitative data 
on diversification strategies (or lack thereof) among smallholder coffee farmers in 
northern Huehuetenango Department in Guatemala, and so contribute to the literature on 
this topic and to the planning and investment of interventions to improve conditions for 
this population.  
3.2 Literature Review 
 
It has been suggested that, in practice, diversification among coffee farmers has 
been driven by their unique socioeconomic conditions, particularly their vulnerability, 
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low incomes and dependency on volatile income sources (Westphal, 2008). Bacon et al. 
(Bacon et al., 2014), for instance, interpreted coffee farmers planting fruit trees and 
subsistence corn and beans as demonstrative of efforts to maintain food sovereignty, as 
well as manage risks. Other drivers of diversification among coffee farmers could be 
consistently disappointing agricultural incomes; land and credit constraints; access to new 
market opportunities; income-smoothing; or anticipation cost savings from production for 
domestic consumption (Méndez, 2008; Ruiz Meza, 2014; Westphal, 2008). More 
recently, scholars have considered whether climate change would drive diversification 
(and also whether diversification could be an important adaptation strategy) (Eakin et al., 
2013).  
 Although diversification is already common attribute of smallholder coffee 
livelihoods, it would appear that there is considerable variation in the prevalence and 
degree of diversification, both within local and regional spaces, as well as between 
regions and between countries. In some studies, incomes of coffee-growing households 
were very diversified (Ruiz Meza, 2014), while other studies showed very little income 
diversity (Méndez, 2008). In addition, although nearly all Mesoamerican coffee farmers 
also produce food for domestic consumption, the degree to which they satisfy household 
food demands differs widely. In a review of recent studies on food production by these 
households, Morris et al. (2013) reported dissimilar capacities to provide for total food 
consumption (yields ranged between 39 and 74 percent of their total food consumption).  
The impacts of diversification and the trade-offs associated with these strategies 
are less clearly laid out in the literature, although there is some concrete evidence and 
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rather extensive theory. Within the agroecology literature, much academic attention has 
been paid to how agrobiodiversity, particularly within the coffee shade canopy, 
contributes to livelihoods (Méndez, et al., 2010; Westphal, 2008). Méndez (2008) 
indicated that bananas, plantains and pacaya received interest as short-term agricultural 
diversification options, as well as fruit trees and timber species in the long-term. Far less 
attention has been paid to the availability and contributions of non-farm and off-farm 
opportunities, and the influence of these activities on coffee landscapes.  
On the one hand, diversification strategies have been shown to have positive 
impacts on both livelihoods and sustainability or resilience. Westphal (2008) showed that 
tree products from coffee shade provided substantial income (on average, this income 
equaled 30 percent of coffee income) without requiring much additional capital or labor 
inputs and complemented coffee production by providing organic matter and shade, and 
possibly also investment capital. International migration of some household members, as 
a diversification strategy, has been shown in some cases to increase local land access and 
improve and expand coffee production among participating households (Aguilar-Støen, 
2015; Bacon, 2008). Caswell (2013) showed that a number of income sources is 
associated with higher levels of food security, although did not indicate whether 
increasing income sources over time was associated with increasing food security.  
Diversification can also have positive impacts social indicators, especially on gender 
relations when women are able to control income from new activities outside of typically 
male-dominated coffee production (Carswell, 2002). 
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However, these positive impacts need to be qualified. Ruiz Meza (2014) points 
out that income diversification, although prevalent, might only serve to cover subsistence 
gaps and so constitute a coping strategy, potentially undermining longer-term adaptive 
strategies. Since coffee is still a “high-value” crop, diversifying away from it might not 
provide the same poverty-reduction benefits as those associated with diversification away 
from staples production in other farming systems (see Birthal, Roy, & Negi, 2015). 
Diversification can also have negative impacts on landscapes if coffee agroforestry 
systems or forests are replaced by less sustainable land uses, such as corn or pasture, 
especially on steep hillsides where the threat of soil erosion is high (Bray, Sánchez, & 
Murphy, 2002; Tay, 2015). Even in shade coffee systems, there is a tension between trees 
that serve human purposes and trees that help maintain biodiversity (Mendez, 2008). 
Certain strategies might have more negative impacts than others. In Westphal 
(2008), off-farm agricultural wage labor was found to exhibit particularly adverse trade-
offs, possibly because agricultural wages are so low or because farmers forego important 
and time-bound practices on their own farms when such practices are in high-demand. As 
for social indicators, migration can increase the prevalence of single-woman-headed 
households and can also exacerbate local income inequality (Ruiz Meza, 2014a). Also, 
subsistence production activities might have a negative impact on cash incomes if 
expensive inputs are purchased to achieve sufficient yields (Morris et al., 2013). 
It is likely that there is just as much variation concerning the impact of 
diversification on families. Adding to this, it is necessary to predict whether certain 
strategies will be more or less effective for livelihoods in the face of climate change and 
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transforming rural economies (Scoones, 2009). Explanations about how and why farmers 
diversify, as well as the differences between farmers who diversify and those who do not 
should be complemented with understandings about the impact of diversification on 
livelihood and ecological outcomes. For instance, although we know that maintaining 
agrobiodiversity can provide for various household needs, one cannot assume that 
maintaining agrobiodiversity must provide a sufficient (or even a good) livelihood choice 
for a household. Indeed, the families surveyed in (Méndez, Bacon, Olson, Morris, et al., 
2010) still lived at or below the poverty line and faced food shortages.  
Using the Livelihoods framework, we could hypothesize that contexts, conditions 
and trends; livelihood resources; or institutional processes and organizational structures 
could be enabling or disabling certain diversification strategies differentially across 
regions and demographics (Scoones, 2009). The same factors would also be expected to 
limit the effectiveness of livelihood diversification in achieving positive livelihood 
outcomes.  
Due to inequalities in household endowments, as well as overarching political, 
economic and agroecological conditions, diversification is unevenly pursued by 
households and the benefits from diversification do not accrue to families equitably. 
What types of factors might enable diversification among smallholder coffee farmers? 
Bathfield et al. (2013) found that access to credit was a major determinant in household’s 
decision to adopt new crops or off-farm employment. Rural development initiatives can 
also spearhead diversification activities. Eakin et al. (2013) attributes crop diversification 
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in the Costa Rican and Honduran samples to such initiatives that were promoting 
incorporation of citrus and subsistence crops.  
What disables diversification? Perhaps the most universal disablers are low levels 
among household “capitals”: a lack of financial capital, a lack of education to take 
advantage of more lucrative opportunities in urban areas, as well as land and labor 
constraints. Insufficient income or restricted access to credit could rule out strategies that 
require a large upfront investment. Farmers might already find it difficult to split their 
labor between coffee and another activity, depending on when the main tasks of these 
activities overlap during the year. For organic producers in Bray et al. (2008), land 
preparation, planting and weeding of maize, coincided with the optimal period for 
pruning, compost applications, shade management and terracing in coffee. Labor 
constraints are a special consideration if climate change requires labor-intensive 
adaptations in coffee management (Eakin et al, 2011).  
Nearby product and labor markets can also be a limiting factor when they are too 
small. Off-farm employment is not always available to coffee farmers, especially in 
countries with high national unemployment rates (Bacon et al., 2008). In El Salvador, 
coffee farmers expressed frustration with the lack of local employment opportunities, 
perceiving this deficiency as a major driver of food insecurity (Morris et al., 2013).  
Social organization can also have an influence on agricultural diversification. 
When farmers are organized in coffee production, they might focus collectively-managed 
land, capital and labor mainly on optimizing coffee production and maximizing incomes 
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from coffee, in contrast to small farmers who maintain agrobiodiversity on their 
smallholdings to satisfy various household needs (Méndez, Bacon, Olson, Morris, et al., 
2010). 
The literature also includes less obvious insights that could limit diversification. 
In some cases, onerous regulations (or at least perceptions of such regulations) could 
dissuade diversification. This might be the reason why coffee farmers would do not 
intentionally plant timber species in their coffee plots (Westphal 2008), although this 
could also be explained by their preference for fruit trees over timber species because of 
fruit trees’ faster returns on investment. Concerns about theft might also disable 
diversification on agricultural land far from the house. In Westphal (2008), this kept at 
least one grower from planting fruit trees on the boundaries of their coffee plots. 
Table 3.1.  
List of factors that encourages or discourage diversification based on previous research 
Encourages diversification… Discourages diversification… 
Large initial endowments Lack of financial capital 
Better access to credit Low levels of education/skills 
Access to development projects Land and labor constraints 
 Insufficient labor and consumer markets 
 Forms of social organization 
 Onerous government regulations 
 Risk of theft 
  
Figure 3.1. illustrates how these factors might be conceptually inserted into the 
Sustainable Livelihoods framework. These factors could explain why entire coffee 
communities and/or demographics might forego diversification. Coffee might (or might 
be perceived to) constitute the only viable option, such shocks such as coffee leaf rust, 
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cause a “doubling down” on coffee production rather than complementing coffee income 
with other economic activities or abandoning coffee altogether. This appears to be 
suggested by the expansion of coffee as a land use in Guatemala in the wake of coffee 
leaf rust. While for many decades national coffee production had stabilized around 
280,000 ha, it surged to 305,000 ha in 2014, likely the result of new plantings (Tay, 
2015). 
 
Figure 3.1. Conceptual map of factors that influence diversification strategies within the 
Sustainable Livelihoods Framework. 
Note. Adapted from Scoones (1998). 
The literature on diversification patterns and correlations between diversification 
and livelihood outcomes has been mainly dominated by methods based around survey 
data. In some cases, survey data has been used to generate farmer typologies in order to 
understand which types of farmers were diversifying, to what ends, and what types of 
impact diversification was having on these groups (Tittonell, 2014). Restricting 
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diversification studies to survey data, however, constitutes a missed opportunity since in-
depth qualitative data can both verify, elaborate on or even correct the hypotheses that 
can be drawn. Survey-based analyses and the creation of typologies can overlook 
important details and complexities (Ellis, 1998), as well as an understanding of 
diversification strategies from the perspective of the rural household (i.e., perceptions, 
attitudes, expectations). These types of data are as relevant as quantitative data to 
stakeholders’ actions, particularly in planning development interventions. This is not to 
neglect authors who have complemented survey-based studies with qualitative data to 
add depth to the literature on diversification, including a focus on farmers’ perceptions on 
these decisions (Méndez, et al., 2010; Eakin et al., 2013). 
3.3 Materials and Methods 
 
 The research for this study was a part of a larger project funded by the CGIAR 
research program on Climate Change, Agriculture and Food Security (CCAFS) assessing 
climate change vulnerability among the members of two coffee cooperatives, one in 
Guatemala and the other in Nicaragua. Ultimately, the project sought to identify and 
scale-up agroecological practices that could promote resilience to climate change through 
investment and on-farm experimentation. 
Before we arrived in Guatemala, arrangements had been made with the coffee 
cooperative, ASOBAGRI, to support us in research logistics and serving as a gatekeeper 
between our team and participants. In the field, we tried mainly to coordinate our 
research with activities managed by the cooperative’s technical assistance team. In other 
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words, we often interviewed participants (or collected soil samples, in the case of one 
research partner) where and while the cooperative extension agents were conducting 
workshops. The collaboration of extension agents (and the good will towards the 
cooperative among its members) brought legitimacy and probably openness to our 
research. These relationships continued to strengthen over the three months of our 
fieldwork. 
The results for this study were derived from 15 interviews with smallholder coffee 
growers in northern Huehuetenango and El Quiché departments in Guatemala using three 
distinct interview guides. The interview guides covered brief historical perspectives on 
specific economic activities; details about the practices involved; yields and prices; 
contributions to livelihoods; comparisons with coffee; reasons for not specializing in 
coffee; reasons for not pursuing other economic alternatives; and plans and expectations 
for the future. (These interview guides are included in Appendices A – C.) Additionally, 
insights from informal conversation and participant observation are used, at certain 
points, to inform or qualify the results. 
 Instead of understanding diversification as a product of quantifiable asset levels, 
this study set out to understand how diversification and livelihood alternatives are 
perceived or interpreted (Ezzy 2002, p. 81), and what themes (i.e., factors) weigh on such 
decisions. This inquiry is valuable under the assumption that diversification is not solely 
an endeavor in an economistic vacuum, but is situated in the interpretations and meanings 
attributed to these actions by farmers.  
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 To gain such insights, the interviews were analyzed using thematic analysis. This 
method allows categories or codes to emerge from the data itself, rather than approaching 
the data with an established hypothesis and predetermined set of categories (Ezzy, 2002). 
Since there was an interest in discovering themes that are associated with (1) 
diversification (or the number of crops and/or income sources) and (2) use of particular 
economic alternatives (for instance, bee-keeping), later stages of the coding process were 
more selective.  
 Interviews were first transcribed and the transcripts were coded preliminarily 
through open coding in one of three ways: by hand, in Microsoft Word using comment 
bubbles and in HyperResearch. Open coding during the first reading ascribed labels to a 
multitude of themes to items within the text and began to group those items, allowing 
strong themes to invoke themselves over the course of the reading (Strauss & Corbin, 
1990). As recommended by Strauss and Corbin (1990), these themes (or categories) were 
then described according to properties and the dimensions of such properties in order to 
relate them to other themes in the data.    
 Using the paradigm model (Strauss and Corbin, 1990), this study was mainly 
interested in phenomena associated with the state of economic being in which households 
must decide to diversify or specialize. codes could be organized as subcategories which 
include the phenomena (eg. allocations) themselves; conditions associated with them; 
“the action/interactional strategies used to manage, handle, respond to [them]”; or their 
“consequences” (Strauss and Corbin, 1990). Denoting each category by its place in the 
paradigm model would allow for an understanding of the relationship between categories.  
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The Results section below offers a description of our respondents’ exposure to 
coffee leaf rust, their responses and their attitudes to future coffee production. This is 
followed by summaries of our respondents’ engagement with alternative or 
complementary livelihood strategies, including their insights as to the merits of each.  
Finally, the study lays out some themes that appear to influence the strategies that the 









Figure 3.3. Location of communities where research was conducted (detail) (©Google Maps) 
 Figure 3.2. and 3.3. indicate the location of communities where interviews were 
conducted. Table 3.2. summarizes the distributions of respondents by community and 
gender. Table 3.3. shows the number of respondents who earn a cash income from 
common non-coffee economic activities or strategies. The number of cash income 
sources among our participants ranged from at least 2 to at least 5 sources with a 






Distribution of respondent by community and gender 
Community Department  Male Female Total 
Nueva Esperanza Huehuetenango  5  5 
Naranjo Huehuetenango  5 1 6 
Chaxa Quiché  2  2 
Nueva Primavera Huehuetenango  1  1 
Las Brisas Huehuetenango   1 1 
Total 
  
13 2 15 
 
Table 3.3. 





Local off-farm employment 3 
Remittances 2 
Government transfers 2 






Small store 1 
Home industry 1 
Temporary migration in-country 1 
Loans 1 
Fruit trees 0 
Black pepper 0 
Sale of physical assets 0 
Note. n = 15. 1 It is possible that the interviews did not capture all the income sources (in particular, 





Figure 3.4. Distribution of respondents according to number of sources of cash income 
 
 
Persistence of coffee 
For the last three harvests (2012 – 2015), coffee leaf rust disease has had a 
devastating impact on coffee yields among most of our respondents. In some cases, the 
disease was so damaging that the trees could not recover and required growers to re-plant 
entire orchards, often requiring respondents to spend their savings and take out loans. In 
addition, respondents indicated that a common coping strategy was to reduce 
employment and commit their own labor to agricultural practices, a shift that should limit 
local employment opportunities. 
However, despite the ongoing crisis, many respondents still cited coffee as the 
principal form of income generation in the region, and all were planning to expand coffee 
production (or would once their economic situations improved). One respondent had a 
less affirmative view of coffee, although his lower estimation had more to do with prices 
than productivity. Respondent 5 had moved to the region in the 1980s from Santa Eulalia, 




















# of income sources
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provided three times the income that it currently offered. He attributed the local rates of 
international migration to the declining value of the crop, including the migration of his 
son, who was serving a prison sentence in the United States. 
Optimism regarding the future suitability of coffee production seemed to revolve 
around two views. First, some saw coffee leaf rust as a temporary problem.  
I think any moment it’s going to pass…then in the old coffee plots there that I still 
have, once the coffee leaf rust is gone, I’m going to…prune [them back]…[Coffee 
leaf rust is losing its strength. I have a plot here, it’s beautiful…There are signs 
[of coffee leaf rust], but it still hasn’t taken hold, whereas in previous years it 
would already have been dropping leaves, now it isn’t (Respondent 14). 
They tended to be of the opinion that the disease had run its course and their position 
gained credence from the fact that their coffee plots appeared to be recovering. Even 
more saw coffee leaf rust as a controllable problem.  
 Well, in my plot, coffee leaf rust did not have much effect since it’s a higher 
 altitude, a few trees, that’s it, but I combatted it with Royano© (Respondent 15).  
This view was held by respondents who were confident about resistant coffee varieties 
and, perhaps to a lesser degree, the sprays being promoted by the cooperative.  
Cardamom 
 Behind coffee, cardamom is the second most important crop for cash income. 
However, respondents emphasized that the returns to cardamom production were far less 
significant than those to coffee. Prices were described as consistently low and there were 
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some doubts as to whether they covered costs. Cardamom production has a long history 
in Guatemala, which is now the world’s top producer and exporter of the crop (Milian, 
2014). Cardamom also has some history among our respondents and its initiation here 
does not necessarily coincide with the onset of coffee leaf rust (some respondents had 
begun to grow cardamom within the last few years, but this was mainly due to their 
recent land purchases from income earned in the United States).  
 The most commonly cited reasons for growing cardamom were that it provided 
income in the months before the coffee harvest and that it provided capital to hire coffee 
harvesters. The advantages attributed to cardamom included that it was relatively easy 
and cheap to grow (it does not require as much labor as coffee); its harvest timeline is 
more flexible than coffee (which needs to be harvested immediately once the cherries 
have matured); and that it can be sold immediately without processing (again, unlike 
coffee). This was especially advantageous for Respondent 3, whose household owns a 
distant plot in another community. Growing coffee there would have required them to 
transport the harvest back to their home community to be processed and then transported 
again to Barillas to be sold. In fact, cardamom could even be sold within many 
communities since there were households that had purchased drying ovens and were 
purchasing the local supply.  
Despite the low prices, many growers would expand cardamom production if their 
landholding allowed it. Of the three respondents who did not grow cardamom, two were 
located near Chajul, where cardamom production is not prevalent, probably due to cooler 
growing conditions. The remaining participant, Respondent 10, had grown cardamom in 
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the past, before abandoning it after determining the crop was not profitable. This 
respondent was calculatingly focused on profitability and was able to produce estimates 
of costs of production for coffee that he had drawn up on his own initiative. 
Milpa 
 All the respondents grew corn and/or beans, or milpa, mainly for domestic 
consumption. Only two respondents mentioned selling these crops (and only Respondent 
15 had sold corn in the previous year). As observed, these two respondents were situated 
in areas where corn production dominated the landscape. Nevertheless, they indicated 
that they were usually only selling a small surplus, and milpa production was not 
necessarily intended as a cash crop. Although two milpa plantings per year were 
common, two respondents had only one annual planting. Respondent 5 forgoes the 
second planting because it conflicts with the coffee harvest. For Respondent 7, only one 
planting is feasible, since he rents his land for milpa and lower yields from the second 
harvest did not seem to justify the cost of renting.  Many respondents rented land for 
milpa, reserving their own land for coffee or cardamom.  
Bananas, other fruits and vegetables 
 Although six of our respondents sold some bananas for income, only Respondent 
9 had committed land specifically to banana production. All six of these respondents 
harvested bananas that were growing in their coffee plots as shade, but typically these did 
not account for more than a few trees. Bananas were typically sold for between Q0.50 to 
Q1 (approximately $0.07 to $0.13) per unit, a price that – as Respondent 1 put it – was 
accepted since they were merely selling them so that they wouldn’t go to waste. A few 
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growers sold them in Barillas, the nearest market town, while Respondent 10 was able to 
sell to other community members. Respondent 9 sold to intermediaries who drove out to 
the community to purchase his harvests.  
 Most respondents had non-banana fruit trees, around the home or as shade in their 
coffee plots, but the economic impact of these fruits in terms of cost-savings is unclear. 
None of the respondents sold fruits. According to Respondents 1 and 2, growing fruits for 
local markets was unfeasible, since there was already access to a consistent supply of 
cheap fruit from the large fruit farms in the lowland regions of the country and 
neighboring Mexico and Belize. 
 Growing vegetables for market is probably limited by similar dynamics: there is 
substantial production in the southern highlands and produce purveyors seem to be well 
established in Barillas’ markets. Only two respondents had begun small home vegetable 
gardens with gravity-fed drip-irrigation systems. This was through a project managed by 
Funcafé, a subsidiary of Anacafé, and funded by USAID’s Proyecto de Cadenas de Valor 
Rurales (Rural Value Chains Project). Respondent 1 expressed disappointment with the 
yields from this project. In general, there did not seem to be much interest in vegetable 
gardens as an alternative source of income. Respondent 15 said that her household was 
not accustomed to growing their own vegetables and she perceived the task as being 
potentially laborious. Independently, most families keep a few guisquil plants, a 
traditional, viney cucurbit that is low maintenance, and several mentioned growing yuca 




 Only Respondent 13 kept bees. Bee-keeping in general was more common in his 
region (near Chajul) than in the other sites in this study. He had managed to grow his bee-
keeping operation quickly over seven years and currently was harvesting from 50 hives 
on less than 0.05 hectares2 of land. Despite last year’s dip in production, which he 
attributed to abnormally rainy conditions, he was especially optimistic about honey 
income, intending to add (i.e., divide) another 20 hives over the next two seasons. The 
price of honey had risen substantially since he began, and was supported by the recent 
formation of a local honey producers’ cooperative. His small operation even included a 
hand-cranked honey extractor. His entry into honey was fostered through a development 
project that had selected a local farmers’ association as a participant. 
 Other respondents were asked about their perceptions of honey. While some 
admitted that honey seemed to be a profitable business, there were obstacles to starting 
out. First, most were unfamiliar with honey production: no other producers in their 
communities had tried it. More importantly, there was an awareness that for honey 
production to be feasible, it was necessary to dedicate a piece of land that was far enough 
from the community and agricultural plots to protect themselves and their neighbors from 
getting stung. In areas where plots were small and densely arranged, honey production 
might be a difficult sell.  
 
                                                 




 In conversation with ASOBAGRI staff, black pepper from pepper trees were 
suggested as a possible alternative crop. Only Respondent 8 had pepper trees and it was 
only harvested for domestic consumption. He expressed reservations about producing 
pepper commercially. First, he did not enough land to commit sole to pepper production 
and he did not feel the growing pepper in association with coffee was a commercially-
viable option, since the pepper trees give off too much shade. Second, he perceived 
pepper production (probably in reference to harvesting) as being too laborious, and he 
was reluctant to trade off labor from coffee production. 
Livestock 
 As regards livestock, cattle, pigs and horses were certainly present in the region, 
but were not very common. The results here generally reflected what was observed by the 
researcher. Respondent 13, the honey producer, also had land in pasture and bought and 
sold cattle – he always had two steers at once, and typically replaced one every year. The 
income from the cow and honey had become more important to his family than coffee, 
although he still expected coffee to be significant in the future. He hoped to grow his herd 
to ten heads, which he thought was a manageable number considering his household’s 
labor. Respondent 12’s household bought and sold horses in the same way. Respondent 
15 mentioned that her household occasionally raised a pig. Her household also had sold 
corn, so there might be an advantage to raising pigs for families with corn surpluses. 
Chickens are ubiquitous, but seem to be sold on an as-needed basis, and none of our 
respondents were raising them as a constant income stream. Respondent 10 raised tilapia 
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and was able to sell his entire harvest within his community. Respondent 11 also raised 
tilapia, but only for domestic consumption. 
Small stores and home industries 
 Only one respondent owned a small store selling packaged snacks and foods and 
basic household items. These stores are common in communities and towns. According 
to Respondent 14, the store’s contribution to his family income is generally very small. 
One extension agent for the cooperative estimated that his family’s store netted ten 
percent profit over its costs and the volume sold was low. Still, they could be feasible 
when the opportunity cost for labor is low, particularly when women or children are 
managing the store, since they are usually kept from agricultural labor (this is changing 
somewhat among members of ASOBAGRI because of the cooperative’s strategy of 
marketing coffee produced by women). Whenever I passed the store owned by the 
cooperative extension team lead, his children were typically managing it, which they 
could do while also finishing their homework.  
 Respondent 12 was the only respondent who had started what could be considered 
a home-based industry: a sastreria, or sewing shop. He and a sister had been trained at 
(and received a diploma from) the Instituto Técnico de Capacitación y Productividad 
(INTECAP), a workforce development institute, after which he bought two sewing 
machines and set up in his family’s home in the town of Chajul. He plans to buy two 
more machines (as he explained, each machine is different and appropriate for a different 




 Only four households found employment off-farm and an additional two 
households received remittances from abroad. Respondent 1 found work as a part-time 
extension agent with the cooperative, although this only provided a month’s-worth of 
work in the previous year. (He was later recruited as a part-time extension agent for the 
regional office of Anacafé, the national coffee association). Although Respondent 9 did 
not mention it during his interview, he was observed working as a builder in his 
community and also owned a small gas-powdered maize mill where community members 
paid to have their corn milled. 
Respondent 3 and Respondent 6 found agricultural employment off-farm, mainly 
performing similar practices that they do on their own farms. But whereas Respondent 3 
was able to find work locally, Respondent 7 had to travel 4 – 5 hours away and would 
travel between his home and the work site every 15 days. Respondent 2 had also done 
agricultural labor in the past, but was able to support himself from his own farm the 
previous year. Agricultural labor, such as this, was pursued out of necessity (i.e. low 
coffee yields) and respondents only sought it for part of the year (from February to 
August). 
Other respondents indicated that they were able to support themselves off of their 
own production, that they had too much work to do on their own farms or that there was 
no advantage to off-farm work since it amounted to the same income. Respondent 8 
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pointed to the trade-offs between own-production and off-farm employment, suggesting 
that he would essentially be abandoning his own operation.  
Government transfers, loans and sales of physical assets 
 Although the interviews only documented two instances where respondents were 
collecting government benefits, it’s possible that other respondents received them who 
were not asked directly. The only government benefit available to our respondents 
seemed to be the Bono Seguro, which was offered to mothers. According to these 
respondents, the amount they received from the Bono had fallen over time and its 
distribution was inconsistent: 
 First, they were giving 600Q. Now it’s 300Q…Sometimes they pay every two 
 months, sometimes every eight [months]. It’s not guaranteed. [They pay] when 
 they want to. (Respondent 15) 
 Respondent 14 mentioned that he had taken out several loans to make up for crop 
losses, one through a bank and another through the cooperative after which, because he 
could not take out an additional loan from either institution, he began borrowing from 
friends. Whereas the formal loans have a 3-percent monthly interest rate, informal loans 
are more expensive (5-percent). The pretext, at least of the cooperative loan, was to 
renovate his coffee plot, which he did using the loan to pay for his own labor, but now he 
is in considerable debt – he owes 15,000Q to the cooperative alone. For other 
respondents, like Respondent 15, the high cost of loans was a deterrent for using this 
strategy as a source of income.  
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 None of our respondents sold land for income in recent years. Chickens were sold 
to make up for income shortfalls as a result of coffee leaf rust, but neither of the 
respondents with larger livestock made sales beyond their typical replacement rate. 
Respondents did, however, mention that they had spent their financial savings. For 
instance, two respondents who had migrated to the United States mentioned that they 
were able to live off of their savings from income earned abroad, and one respondent, 
who had accumulated savings from coffee in the past, had spent them to cover losses 
associated with coffee leaf rust. 
3.4.1. Themes Mediating Diversification 
 
 Despite our respondents’ exposure to shocks to coffee-based livelihoods strategies 
(principally, price crises and coffee leaf rust), few of the interviews demonstrate that 
alternative strategies were undertaken explicitly to mitigate their exposure to risk. This 
was especially surprising in the case of cardamom, which would appear to be an example 
of planned redundancy as second income-generating export crop. However, only 
Respondent 5 expressed cardamom’s value as such: 
 I thought, one day, there are going to be losses in coffee and having cardamom 
 will help me; one day there will be losses in cardamom and having coffee will 
 help me. 
Instead, incorporation of cardamom into farming systems was explained as a 
method of income-smoothing (Westphal, 2008). This smoothing had two purposes. First, 
it allowed farmers to cover household expenses in the months leading up to the coffee 
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harvest, presumably when income from the previous coffee harvest were exhausted. 
Second, it allowed farmers to cover labor costs for the harvest, since all our respondents 
(and most households in the region) need to employ harvesters from outside their family.  
 Approaches to diversification, particularly in the case of cardamom, could also be 
interpreted as an attempt to optimize resources. Commonly cited advantages of 
cardamom were that its production costs were low and it required relatively less labor 
than coffee. Since the costs of production are almost exclusively labor, the decision to 
grow cardamom could be interpreted as a labor optimization decision. Cardamom also 
offers a more flexible harvesting timeline than coffee, which respondents suggested 
needed to be harvested immediately upon maturing, so that cardamom can be gathered 
between major coffee harvests. In some cases, growing cardamom instead of coffee was a 
more feasible use of plots when plots were far from the home, as in the case of 
Respondent 3, whose household owned a plot of land in a distant community.  
 Optimizing resources could also be seen as disabling certain strategies. For 
example, respondents indicated that they did not pursue off-farm employment because it 
would mean abandoning their crops. They were likely interpreting off-farm employment 
as temporary migration, but the answer might reveal that off-farm employment is 
perceived as a coping strategy that could threaten to compromise longer-term agricultural 
livelihoods, underlining the commitment to an agricultural trajectory. While bad harvests, 
such as those experienced under coffee leaf rust, might limit labor opportunities, they 
might also induce allocation of family labor to the farm if they cope with losses by 
reducing hiring outside the family.  
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The degree of familiarity with a strategy could also seemed to influence whether a 
household adopted it. Respondents were very familiar with cardamom since it has been 
produced for longer periods of time either by the respondents themselves or by their 
neighbors. When a few respondents were asked whether there were farmers who had lots 
of success with cardamom, they referred to growers in the region surrounding nearby 
Ixcán and Cobán, where cardamom is grown on a larger scale. Through Respondent 1’s 
description of cardamom practices, it also became clear the cardamom propagation is 
very similar to that of coffee propagation. Although some respondents offered positive 
perceptions of honey and pepper prices (Respondent 10 even expressed confidently that 
honey would be a profitable strategy), it was also clear that producing these items on a 
commercial scale was limited partly by a lack of experience and not necessarily by 
doubts about their economic value. 
Economic ideologies and future-planning could also explain household decision-
making. Goldín (2009) has shown how changing economic landscapes under 
globalization translate into changes in economic perspectives among rural Mayan people 
in Guatemala. Many of our respondents related their own capacity to improve their 
incomes with their capacity to expand their agricultural production. When asked how her 
household could improve their income, Respondent 15 said simply by planting more 
coffee, since coffee yielded more than any other option. Only Respondent 12, who was 
the youngest respondent at 25 years old and who had worked in Guatemala City for six 
years (in a restaurant), expressed the limits of a strictly farm-based livelihood: 
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For the farmer, what he produces is what he consumes; but a person who wants 
 something more looks for a way to improve things, figures out how he is going to 
 get ahead. That’s why I’m thinking of having, in the future, the sewing machines, 
 a clothing shop, and in this way, I’ll earn more income.  
Here, we can only speculate on the extent to which this attitude reflects the respondent’s 
age or his experience living and working in an urban area. Interestingly, the respondents 
who had migrated to the United States did not show as strong a split from the agriculture-
based ideology. Most used their migration savings to buy land and build houses in rural 
communities, so that, in practice, migration seemed to be a short-term phase embedded in 
a long-term agricultural strategy, rather than a long-term strategy on its own. Of these, 
Respondent 1 had received part-time work as an extension agent and Respondent 10 did 
some local construction, but both appeared set on agricultural trajectories. With that said, 
some respondents who had migrated would not rule out returning to the United States in 
the future.  
We can conceive of diversification as serving distinct trajectories among rural 
households: as a temporary re-organization that eventually allows smallholders to adapt 
and reproduce their strictly agriculture-based livelihoods; as a movement towards a 
multiple-activity household arrangement (Amekawa, 2011); or as a piecemeal transition 
out of agriculture (Dorward et al., 2015). However, despite adults’ aspirations for 
agriculture-based growth, parents’ focus on formal education for their children seems to 
suggest that these plans might be “generation”-bound, and that aspirations with regards to 
children might be very different. One could intuit from the responses that aspirations with 
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regards to children appear to vary more than aspirations for personal trajectories, but they 
are also difficult to decipher from the transcripts. The primacy of education was a theme 
throughout the interviews, and did have an effect on how households allocated the labor 
of young people. Some of the respondents indicated that education was prioritized over 
agricultural labor and migration. This might suggest that households are willing to forego 
additional income from young people in the short term to opt for longer-term benefits. If 
true, it reflects considerable optimism about returns to education. Respondent 13, for 
instance, was investing heavily in his children’s education, spending Q11,000 
(approximately $1,475 in 2015) a year for his son’s bachiller3 at the University of Sololá. 
Perceptions related to skills also seemed to limit options for non-agricultural 
employment. Respondents seemed to categorize off-farm employment into two camps - 
off-farm agricultural labor and all other off-farm opportunities – which reflects 
categorizations in the academic literature on diversification, but not necessarily notions of 
skilled versus unskilled labor. Respondents considered themselves qualified for 
agricultural labor, since it usually constituted the same activities that they practice on 
their own farms. However, for all other types of off-farm labor, including construction, 
most respondents considered themselves unqualified, reporting that they were excluded 
from such opportunities for lack of formal education and a title. Although the interviews 
did not probe into other types of labor that could be construed as “unskilled” (i.e. not 
                                                 
3 Secondary school in Guatemala (and Mexico) is split into two three-year phases. Bachiller or 
preparatorio are the second of these phases, and presumably help young people access higher-wage 
employment opportunities in urban areas. 
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requiring formal training), the respondents either considered them undesirable or out-of-
reach, or they were unaware they existed.  
Social capital seemed to influence diversification activities, particularly in the 
pursuit of off-farm work. While the lack of employment opportunities is, in general, a 
major issue for rural communities, in this study, the respondents who worked off-farm for 
some part of the year revealed that social capital was a major factor in how, where and 
when smallholders can access scarce employment opportunities. Respondent 8 related 
that he had connections with local large-scale farmers and also farmers who had 
alternative income sources, such as teachers. Respondent 2 told me that friends were able 
to employ him or he could work on his father’s land for a few days per week. Since off-
farm work was being pursued as a coping strategy in the wake of coffee leaf rust rather 
than as a planned and fixed diversification strategy per-se, we could hypothesize that 
social capital was especially important, since it allowed for more flexible access to 
“employment-as-needed.”  
Eakin & Wehbe (2009), in their study of coffee farmer adaptations to climate 
change, have pointed out that interactions with external actors can also influence 
smallholders’ decisions, mainly through the mechanisms of motivating factors and 
information. Membership in a coffee growers’ cooperative or interactions with Anacafé 
could be bolstering the primacy of coffee, which could be seen as a disincentive for 
diversification. This happens in two ways. First, the cooperative provides better prices for 
coffee. If these prices off-set the additional costs of producing certified coffee and 
participating in cooperative functions than coffee specialization could become more 
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appealing than diversification. As Respondent 1 emphasized, it was the cooperative’s 
price for coffee that made production feasible, despite higher costs. Second, extension 
agents from the cooperative and Anacafé influence growers’ expectations about the 
future of coffee production. During my visit, extension agents seemed very optimistic 
about their members’ ability to regain yields through the use of resistant varieties and 
additional inputs (i.e. sprays). They also were managing a project to build greenhouse 
coffee-drying systems. These types of “expert” investments could send strong messages 
to the communities. 
 These influences were missing in the case of honey production, which has been a 
particularly promising intervention on a global scale, especially for growers associated 
with nearby forests (Girma & Gardebroek, 2015), and even has been applied by other 
projects within the provinces where this study was located. As Ayuya et al. (2015) has 
pointed out, access to information about honey production through extension agents and 
farmer-to-farmer networks can have a great influence on whether growers adopt honey 
production. In the case of Respondent 13, honey production was consistently supported 
first by a local farmers’ association and later by a marketing cooperative, and it would be 
possible to infer that such externally-originating motivating factors and social capital 
were critical to overcoming these disincentives. 
 Respondents with small vegetable gardens had been enrolled in a development 
project, which was being delivered across Anacafé’s and the cooperative’s networks. 
Participants received training in bed preparation and basic horticulture, and received 
seeds and a “mini”-irrigation systems, which consisted of a plastic barrel, a manifold and 
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drip tape. The goal of the project was to support food security rather than income 
generation, and the size of many of the gardens reflected that.  
3.5. Discussion 
 
 Figure 3.5. places these additional factors within the Sustainable Livelihoods 
Framework. Some of these factors fit easily into the conceptual map. For instance, human 
capital could incorporate the theme of familiarity with activities and practices that 
resemble existing activities (eg. similarity between coffee and cardamom practices) or 
that are performed successfully within the community by other growers. In addition, 
influences from external actors appears to fit well within the column dedicated to 
‘Institutions and Processes,’ especially because these influences tend to be integrated into 
regional rural development programs. On the other hand, this study highlighted several 
factors that were related to households’ agency, particularly their expectations and 
aspirations. Although they appear to weigh on households’ decisions regarding 





Figure 3.5. Conceptual map of factors that influence diversification strategies within the 
Sustainable Livelihoods Framework, including factors highlighted by this study 
Note. Adapted from Scoones (1998). 
While many households had more than one income source, these alternative 
activities should not necessarily be interpreted as a risk management strategy, as such. 
Cardamom production was common before the onset of coffee leaf rust, and some 
respondents who had begun growing cardamom in the last few years, had also recently 
returned after immigrating abroad. In some cases, coffee leaf rust forced an expansion of 
milpa plots and the sale of household agricultural labor, but these strategies are easily 
reversed and more likely to reflect coping strategies than adaptation to new conditions of 
risk and uncertainty. In general, milpa is expressed less as a risk management strategy 
and more as a necessity associated with consistent gaps between coffee incomes and 
household expenses. Regularly planned off-farm work arrangements do not seem to be 
reflected by the responses, although maintaining social relationships with employers 
could be considered “risk management.”  Taken together with the optimism regarding 
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coffee and plans to expand coffee plots, these attitudes and performances appear to 
constitute a doubling-down on coffee production. 
Largely, however, these strategies, particularly cardamom, are still referred to in 
terms of their complementary (rather than alternative) nature to coffee production. 
Cardamom complements coffee through cash flow, but also because it does not require 
large labor investments, and so does not significantly constrain labor flowing to coffee 
production. The intention of many growers is to expand coffee production, despite recent 
experiences with crop losses from coffee leaf rust disease.  
A few theories could explain the persistent optimism regarding coffee, despite 
price volatility, the recent experience with coffee leaf rust and climatic changes. First, the 
respondents expressed strongly that coffee was the primary base for rural livelihoods in 
their region, and so coffee production could be promising because it has to be. Second, 
respondents in this area might not perceive coffee leaf rust and climatic change to be as 
pernicious as their observers. Climate change might not manifest as obviously here as it 
does in other regions. Third, cooperative membership has improved coffee prices and 
provided technical assistance. Cooperative agents tend to be encouraging with regard to 
the future of coffee production, and growers might take this promotion to heart. Taking 
this into consideration, initiatives that encourage diversification away from coffee (i.e. a 




Models of the factors that encourage or discourage diversification could be useful 
when planning interventions that seek to promote diversification activities. Previous 
research has mainly focused on assets such as financial capital, natural capital (i.e., size 
of landholding), labor availability and market constraints. It has also identified less 
common factors, such as social organization, government regulations and potential for 
theft. This study builds upon such a model by adding factors such as confidence in 
primary crop, economic ideologies, familiarity with performance of certain activities, 
future-planning and aspirations of households, primacy of educational continuity for 
children as a household goal, social networks, and influences on motivations from 
external actors. Some of these factors only applied to certain activities in this study; for 
example, social networks were most important for attaining nearby off-farm employment 
that could complement agricultural self-employment.  
Although farmers did not express risk minimization explicitly, it does not 
necessarily follow that the alternative activities do not count as risk management 
strategies. One possible explanation for the lack of discussion around risk is that 
respondents were asked about particular activities rather than about livelihood security, in 
general. This might have drawn attention to how these activities interact functionally with 
one another (i.e. cash flow), rather than how these activities compensate for the 
weaknesses of others in the grand scheme. In the former relationships, risk minimization 
might be less apparent, less tangible, operating in the background. Another explanation is 
that farmers might prefer to focus on what they have managed to control or what 
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empowers them, whereas external risks are a less appealing topic of conversation, 
perhaps reserving discussions about risk for the “hidden transcript” (Scott, 1990). 
Perhaps this research would have benefited by collecting data on indicators for 
livelihood security, and then comparing these with chosen strategies to arrive at 
hypotheses about risk minimization. However, in order for risk to result in new economic 
activities, it is not enough for it exist (in the eyes of external observers) as the Sustainable 
Livelihoods framework would suggest, and so the above strategy would be insufficient. 
Risk must also be perceived by smallholders and they must be persuaded that new 
activities can mitigate that risk. In addition, “the social meaning of particular risks is 
often far removed from the bounds of probabilistic thinking and, rather, is framed in 
terms of cultural meaning and affect” (Wilkinson, 2010, p. 70). Evaluating whether these 
pre-conditions for behavior change exist implies methodological challenges. Further 
research could explore smallholder coffee farmers’ conceptions of specific types of risks 
(rather than Risk, loosely defined) (Harwood, et al., 1999)  and the different mitigation 
strategies associated with them. It should also capture farmers’ assessments of the 
efficacy of these strategies. 
When considering diversification “strategies,” we can also fall into the bad habit 
of assuming that the household is implementing a carefully determined plan. As Richards 
(1989, as cited in Scoones & Thompson (1994)) has emphasized this runs the risk of 
conflating “plans” and “performance.” Studies of diversification should also consider 
how smallholders use agricultural livelihoods, rural networks and performances as a 
source of identity and to generate a sense of pride, and what influence these predilections 
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have on decision-making with regard to diversification, as well as the ways in which 
different strategies allow farmers to maintain their sense of identity, and so self-esteem. 
Influences from external actors could play into and accentuate these factors. Similarly, in 
the context of dense social networks, skillfulness in coffee growing could be instrumental 
not in economic terms, but in terms of social status (Granovetter, 2005). 
Drawing from Granovetter (2005), social structure is probably as important as the 
asset base in guiding growers to diversification strategies (and their ability to support 
livelihoods). These processes could function through the influence of social network 
density on growers’ behaviors vis-à-vis locally established norms and the influence of 
social institutions and actions that lead to non-economic activities (i.e., interactions 
between family members) resulting informally in either additional economic cost 
disadvantages or advantages. Dense social networks could help to promote new 
acitivities, particularly if such promotion requires collective action and trust. They could 
also dampen interest among individuals pursuing new strategies independent of the larger 
group. This provides an important implication for development practitioners, since 
projects could derive more benefit from social structure if they scale the project to the 
limits of a single community (rather than to cooperative membership), especially 
considering the isolation of communities from other networks and from one another. 
However, community mapping would be necessary to verify that the social networks 
within communities are indeed dense.    
Off-farm work, in this case, provides an interesting illustration of what 
Granovetter (2005) has called “the strength of weak tie”: while the ties within closely-
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knit social networks can resolve free-rider issues and promote collective action, weaker 
ties, or “acquaintances,” can connect growers to novel opportunities and innovations 
outside of their immediate networks. In this case, both “strong” and “weak” ties (as well 
as the connections between them) serve purposes within the asset portfolio, particularly 
as regards diversification. This need not apply only to labor opportunities. Social position 
could also influence whether a grower will reproduce local routines or deviate from them 
towards other innovations. We could speculate on how the time that Respondent 12 spent 
in Guatemala City, both exposed him to new ways of thinking, but also distanced him 
from the social core of his community, and the influence these factors had on his 
determination to invest in the clothing shop.  
Beyond awareness and access to opportunities and innovations, social structure 
could influence the success and contributions of diversification strategies in terms of 
different livelihood outcomes, through mechanisms such as cooperation, local experts 
exhibiting “tacit knowledge,” and learning through interaction. Although Granovetter 
(2005) demonstrates this in the context of internal relationships between employees of a 
firm, it does not require much imagination to see how this could play out among coffee 
growers experimenting with honey production, for example. Taking into consideration 
diversification as performance, we can both attempt to understand both sociocultural 
methods for diversifying and how interventions could mimic those methods, and we can 




 Extension agents might have an influence on which strategies producers adopt. It 
would appear that the main barrier to expansion of honey production is a lack of 
familiarly. In our study, Respondent 13 demonstrated that honey production can be 
lucrative and returns from production can grow rather quickly. However, honey 
production must also overcome the perceived barriers of needing a plot of land isolated 
from the community and neighboring plots where bees could harm workers, other 
farmers or livestock. These factors apparently provide strong disincentives and can lead 
to the project failures described in two of the interviews.  
There might be limits to the alternatives for coffee growers, especially those on 
marginal lands.  Horticultural and non-farm employment pathways might only be feasible 
for areas near to urban areas and roads; whereas coffee production depends on roads but 
not as much on proximity to markets, due to its “high value to volume ratio and relatively 
low perishability (Pender, 2004),” although this author suspects that education and 
training for off-farm opportunities will be necessary in this pathway.  While diversifying 
farms to provide additional products for domestic consumption might alleviate 
expenditure pressures, it is still unclear how much families are saving, and whether such 
savings constitute viability. They might also be consistent with smallholder trajectories, 
especially regarding the priority of education as a household livelihood strategy, which 
requires cash (not in-kind) investments. Growing fruits and vegetables for local and 
regional markets is perhaps an even more untenable option, since these markets are often 
well-integrated with suppliers from large fruit plantations in lowland areas and 
 55 
 
established vegetable growers with less marginal land endowments. In addition, many of 
these crops share co-variate risks with coffee vis-à-vis climatic change.  
Regarding alternative export products, such as cardamom, honey and pepper, it is 
unclear whether they will be able to make up for gaps in coffee incomes over the long 
term. For one thing, these products also have their price limitations, especially 
cardamom. Secondly, these products are not immune to their own threats. A recent 
outbreak of an insect pest (Thrips) in nearby Alta Verapaz Department has significantly 
reduced the selling price of cardamom there (Woods, 2015). Respondent 13 indicated that 
especially rainy conditions, which he attributed to climate change, reduced his honey 
yields by 25 percent. 
It’s also unclear whether markets (particularly, alternative markets) can absorb 
increasing supply from new producers (although Ayuya et al. (2015) suggested the 
expanding local markets for organic products in Kenya, resulting from urbanization and 
higher living standards, were leading to returns to organic honey production that 
increased certified producers’ odds of escaping multidimensional poverty). This 
reservation also applies to home-based businesses, like stores, and petty industrial 
production, like the sewing shop. Although a store can contribute to one family’s income, 
most communities already appeared to be saturated with this type of establishment and it 
is unlikely that the scope of this activity can be expanded to support other households.  
Linkages with economic growth in second- or third-tier cities for labor 
opportunities and consumers of non-agricultural goods and services could potentially 
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meet rural households’ demand for higher and more stable incomes, but these linkages 
are complex and rural employment opportunities are notoriously difficult to foster 
through policy. In addition, we do not know how such linkages would exacerbate rural 
income inequality or what impacts rural non-farm employment would have on 
sustainable land use since it at least partially de-links livelihoods from the natural 
resource base. 
Another direction for future research is the interaction between emigration and 
remittances. First, emigration and remittances are a form of diversification with unique 
contributions, as well as costs. They are also factors that could influence whether and 
how households choose to diversify, both through the way that the build assets or 
constrain labor, as well as change the aspirations, expectations and ideologies of 
household members. Although only two of our respondents received a cash income 
through remittances, many of our respondents had either migrated themselves or had 
family members who had migrated in the past. For Respondent 9, the income earned from 
migration was considerable and he was able to buy an incredibly large landholding. 
Although his coffee plot was relatively small, he was able to plant corn on his own land, 
able to grow a separate plot of bananas, purchase a gas-powdered corn mill, and found 
work locally in home construction (skills that he had developed while working as a 
migrant in the United States). In addition, his son was a U.S. citizen and he maintained a 
good relationship with an American family. He anticipated sending his son to school in 
the United States, a vision that would fall outside the trajectory of a typical household. 
However, as the case of Respondent 5’s son shows, emigration as a strategy also implies 
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risks, and falling on the wrong side of this risk could mean that a household suffers more 
as a result of diversifying in this way.  
In general, emigration appeared to be use as an entry into agriculture-based 
livelihoods, not a transition out of it, since it afforded land-constrained households the 
opportunity to build up their landholdings and invest in their physical homes in the 
communities. This is interesting because households choose to invest in rural physical 
capital and agriculture, rather than urban capital and skills relevant to urban markets. 
Future research should explore the mechanisms that lead migrants to focus on agricultural 
strategies.  
I should also caution that while many of our respondents viewed agriculture as 
their primary income source moving forward, it was less obvious that they expected their 
children to be dependent on agriculture, as well. Agriculture might be viewed as the best 
option that allows households to remain together and to cover educational costs while 
they strategically position their children for non-agricultural or, at least, not exclusively 
agricultural livelihoods in the future. Future research should explore these motivations 
more deeply.  
Although it was beyond the scope of this study, an important area for further 
research is how development interventions, such as the promotion of diversification 
activities, can account for the traumatic experiences suffered by actors in the recent past. 
Guatemalans were exposed to violent events during the armed conflict, and probably due 
to the protracted nature of the war, this violence became routine and manifested in gang 
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activity, extrajudicial homicides and intra-familial abuse (Puac-Polanco et al., 2009). A 
nationally representative study demonstrated, not surprisingly, that Guatemalans who 
were exposed to violence had significantly higher rates of PTSD, especially among 
indigenous Mayans and women.  How do these experiences encourage or discourage 
actors from engaging in new livelihood strategies? Whereas some research has consider 
the impact of violence on development through high medical costs and productivity 
losses (Bowman, et al., 2008), more research is required to understand how PTSD could 
restrict participation and risk-taking in new livelihood activities, and how practitioners 
and participants can transform the context of these mental health outcomes. 
3.5.1. Limitations  
Although responses could not be analyzed quantitatively (due to the use of 
different iterations of interview guides and missing information on specific strategies and 
household attributes), this study provides a significant contribution to conceptions of 
diversification among rural households and indicates several topics that should be 
included in interviews serving larger-scale studies, particularly concerning sociological 
factors that do not fit as neatly into current development frameworks.  
In some ways, the lack of consistency (from a quantitative perspective) between 
the interview guides forced a more rigorous qualitative analysis of the data - themes were 
drawn out by re-reading (and re-reading) transcripts and were informed by knowledge 
from informal conservations and participant observation. The interesting results that this 
study was able to provide might have been eclipsed had the data been more amenable to 
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“neater” forms of inquiry. This underscores the value of earnest exploratory research in 
laying the foundation for knowledge-generation. 
A major limitation of this study relates to the nature of thematic analysis, which 
relies mainly on the intuition and creativity of the interpreter (Ezzy, 2002). Since the 
analysis did not lead to further sampling, further research could serve to extend the 
insights here into grounded theory (Ezzy, 2002). It is appropriate and timely to present 
these results since the intention is not to be conclusive, but instead to inform future 
research. Nevertheless, even for our purposes, the interviews could have focused more on 
depth. This would have been especially useful in allowing respondents to “speak” more 
throughout the results by inclusion of more illuminating quotes. These interviews often 
were split between numerical information or very brief answers, on the one hand, and 
longer answers, on the other, usually at the whim of the respondent. An important lesson 
was learned here: while researchers should strive to incorporate mixed methods into their 
projects, especially on topics as complex as these, each of these methods should be 
realized fully. That is, it might not be possible to collect rich qualitative and valid and 
reliable quantitative data into a single interview. However, this lesson also implies that 
fully-realized mixed methods might entail far greater demands on resources. 
3.5.2. Conclusions 
How can livelihood diversification be supported? Since farmers already actively 
derive benefits from agrobiodiversity, supporting agrobiodiversity conservation would 
align with current practices and could satisfy both conservation and livelihoods goals. 
Certification schemes and payments for ecosystem services (PES) are two familiar 
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interventions that could promote diversification that provides ecological and social 
resilience, though these mechanisms are not without their limitations, especially their 
failure to engage the smallholder participation (Méndez et al., 2010).  
PAR processes might be more effective than top-down interventions to help 
farmers become aware of the benefits of certain diversification strategies and, since they 
include an action-oriented component, could even initiate change at the household and 
community level, but the scale of impact has been limited by funding (Méndez et al., 
2010). It is hoped that the results here will provide context to future PAR activities in the 










CHAPTER 4: ORGANIC AND CONVENTIONAL SMALLHOLDER COFFEE 
PRODUCTION COSTS AND NET INCOME AND COMPARISON TO 
POVERTY THRESHOLDS IN THE COMMUNITY OF NUEVA ESPERANZA, 




 This study is interested in both the economic viability of certified organic coffee 
production founded on organized marketing schemes, as well as the relative advantages 
of these systems compared with smallholder conventional production founded on 
individual marketing to local intermediaries. The study is primarily concerned with two 
questions:  
1. To what extent do organic and organized farmers’ coffee incomes contribute 
to poverty alleviation? 
2. Are incomes from organic production and organized marketing higher than 
incomes from conventional production and individual marketing? 
However, this study also sought to answer some of the more detailed components 
of these questions. It adds to the previous list: 
1. How do organic and conventional practices differ? 
2. How do these growers compare in terms of yields and prices? 
3. Do organic producers have high labor investments? 
4. Do conventional producers have higher input costs? 
5. Who pays more in total production costs? 
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6. Do producers engaged in certified markets have higher harvesting and 
processing costs (to achieve higher bean quality)? 
7. Did organic producers have a higher effective wage than their conventional 
counterparts? 
Although these questions have been explored in previous research, re-evaluation 
is warranted for several reasons. First, practices might be different than other regions and 
could change over time in response to increasing access to technical assistance or in 
response to new conditions, such as coffee leaf rust disease. Productivity gaps between 
organic/organized growers and conventional growers can change over time, especially if 
the former have more access to technical assistance through their cooperatives or as new 
products become accessible to smallholders. Costs of production can change over time 
and might not necessarily follow rates of inflation. This could be true of input costs (eg. 
rising fertilizer prices) or labor costs, perhaps due to labor market dynamics. Prices could 
become more favorable for organized growers as cooperatives increase their 
administrative capacity, build financial capital and increase their membership, thereby 
increasing their negotiating power. Landholdings could change over time in a number of 
ways, including division of plots for inheritances and expansion of plots with capital from 
temporary migration. For these reasons, snapshots of revenues, costs and profits, and so 
snapshots of viability, are limited in their explanatory and predictive power. 
4.2. Literature Review 
 
Bacon et al. (2008) has suggested that organic coffee farming could be an 
especially viable alternative in areas characterized by underemployment and low 
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opportunity costs for family labor. This is similar to the positive rendering of household 
self-exploitation that gives it an advantage to family farming over capitalized operations. 
The following review covers studies that have looked into the economic feasibility of 
smallholder organic coffee growing, as the comparisons between organic and 
conventional coffee production systems. 
The literature is inconclusive when it comes to the gaps between organic and 
conventional yields. For instance, Bacon et al. (2008) notes that conventional high-input 
systems yield five to ten times more than traditional systems. But this likely refers to 
widely different production systems, and differences between low-input conventional 
systems and certified low input systems might be smaller. Lyngbaek et al. (2010) found 
that between 10 organic growers and 10 conventional growers, organic yields were 22 
percent lower, but when these growers were paired, five of the organic growers had 
higher yields than their conventional counterparts. Bray et al. (2008), on the other hand, 
found that transition to organic production increased yields by as much as 15 percent. 
Beuchelt & Zeller (2011) also found higher yields among organic producers than both 
conventional and organic-fairtrade certified growers. They attributed this mainly to 
different quantities of fertilizers, better management practices and higher planting 
density. 
Yields tend to vary widely within both classes of production. Valkila (2009) 
shows a wide range of (self-reported) two-year average yields from organic production: 
288.81 to 2,636.73 pounds of green coffee per hectare (with an average of 1,150.81 ± 
513.68 lbs/ha). In comparison, conventional farmers reported two-year average yields 
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between 520.29 to 5,795.95 lbs/ha (with an average of 1,790.15 lbs ± 1155.22 lbs/ha). 
These figures also indicate that while organic and conventional yields are markedly 
different on the upper or “high-intensity” end of both ranges, the lower end or “low-
intensity” systems are less distinct. This could explain how organic producers were able 
to increase their yields over their conventional counterparts in Bray (2008). 
Yields are also exposed to external threats. Recently, coffee leaf rust disease has 
caused dramatic crop losses for many Arabica coffee producers. The USDA Foreign 
Service estimated that average Guatemalan coffee yields fell from 2425.08 lbs/ha during 
the 2011-2012 harvest to 1,829.83 lbs/ha by the 2013-2014 harvest, a 25 percent 
reduction. Most recently, average yields increased to 1984.16 lbs/ha, perhaps due in part 
to changes in management practices (i.e. heavier pruning and increased fumigation) (Tay, 
2015).4  
 Lyngbaek et al. (2001) measured an average price premium for certified 
producers (including some producers who did no earn a premium) at 20 percent over 
prices received by conventional producers. Due to limited effective demand, growers 
might not be able to sell all their coffee at premium rates, and so the farm-gate price does 
not often reflect the premium received for certified coffee but a combination of premiums 
and conventional market prices (Barham & Weber, 2012). These authors calculated a 3-
year average premium (2006 – 2008) at 7.4 percent of market price. 
                                                 
4 Since 99 percent of Guatemalan coffee production is Arabica, it could be assumed that these figures are 
close to those of Arabica-only production data, but obviously the USDA data does not differentiate 
between farm scale and organic versus conventional management. 
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 Certification premiums tend to grow or shrink with conventional market prices. 
Comparing Fair Trade organic premiums with Conacafé conventional price estimates, 
Valkila (2009) showed that Fair Trade organic premiums received a 30.5% premium in 
2005, when prices were low, to a 7.6% premium in 2008, when prices were high. (These 
figures do not include the social premiums that are managed by the cooperatives and 
invested in cooperative infrastructure, programs or certification payments.)  
 In cases where growers receive premiums through cooperatives, cooperatives will 
often pay the certification costs as well as cover their own operating costs (Bacon, 2005), 
such that the premiums received at farm-gate are lower than premiums received for 
coffee sold by the cooperative. Lyngbaek (2001) estimated that when accounting for 
certification costs, price premiums for certified production would need to reach, on 
average, 38 percent over conventional prices to produce a similar net income. 
 Both Barham & Weber (2012) and Beuchelt & Zeuchelt (2011) have suggested 
that, among organic growers, yields have played a much more important role in 
increasing net incomes than prices. Many other authors have pointed out that premiums 
from certifications are not sufficient for ensuring sustainable livelihoods (Bacon, 2008; 
Bray et al., 2008). This is especially problematic when considering that the future of price 
premiums could be uncertain as new certifying regimes compete for the same consumer 




Despite being a perennial crop, coffee production is labor-intensive, particularly 
for smallholders. In the early 2000s, Anacafé reported that production costs for 
Guatemalan growers were unevenly split between labor (70%) and inputs (30%) (as cited 
in Tay, 2015).5  The largest labor costs were paid during harvest (66%), followed by an 
unspecified “other” category (11%)6, soil management (7%), weed control (6%) and 
shade management (5%). Proportionately, much lower labor costs were committed to 
tissue management (i.e. pruning) and pest and disease control, although these might also 
be less labor-intensive practices.  
Fertilizers made up the bulk of input costs (81%) followed by fungicides and 
herbicides (5% each) and “other” inputs (9%). It does not appear that equipment, 
infrastructure, land and land preparation and seedling costs (as well as loan repayments 
and taxes) were included in these reports. While it is expected that organic, smallholder 
production costs will vary significantly from these figures, they are useful for a 
comparison. These production costs obviously do not include land acquisition, seedling 
propagation or purchase, orchard establishment, transportation to markets, transaction 
costs, debt repayments and participation in cooperative events.  
Organic growers would be expected to have high labor demands (and costs) 
especially in the production and application of compost. In fact, Beuchelt & Zeller (2011) 
found that the higher labor costs of organic production offset their savings on input costs. 
                                                 
5 Since these costs include conventional and large-scale growers, organic and smallholder growers might be 
expected to invest an even higher percentage in labor vis-à-vis inputs. 




Lyngbaek et al. (2001) attributed lower average organic yields to these larger labor 
demands since such demands might force organic growers to make trade-offs when 
deciding where to allocate their labor. Whereas conventional producers spent more labor 
on harvesting (due to higher yields), organic growers invested more labor into plot 
management. On average, organic costs were 4.5 percent higher. 
Management costs depend on the intensity of plot management (Barham & 
Weber, 2012). Efforts to improve yields are often constrained by access to land, and so 
growers rely on intensifying production, whether organically or conventionally. For 
organic growers, intensifying production typically means increased pruning and bringing 
in organic materials from off-farm, which can be more or less difficult depending on 
proximity of suppliers (eg. cattle or chicken industries). Dependence on off-farm inputs 
also exposes organic growers to price risks typically associated with conventional inputs 
(Barham & Weber, 2012). 
Valkila (2009) attempted to show that fertilization costs (i.e. providing the same 
amount of nitrogen to coffee orchards) were equal if not lower for organic producers, 
despite higher labor costs associated with compost production and application (Lyngbaek 
et al. (2001) shows them to be similar). However, as Valkila (2009) also notes it is likely 
that organic fertilizers are less efficient in terms of nutrient provision and so even more 
fertilizer (in weight) would need to be supplied to achieve comparable yields.  
This presents two problems. First, it would raise monetary costs for organic 
producers since it would require purchases of organic materials from off the farm, as well 
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as additional labor. Second, these organic materials might not be easily accessible, so that 
farmers either could be forced to pay steep transaction costs acquiring the materials (from 
negotiating with providers to transport on bad mountain roads) or accept nutrient cycling 
constraints.7 Although proponents of organic agriculture might be less concerned with 
matching conventional yields through nutrient provision (i.e. intensification), the 
potential costs of simply replacing nutrients that have been harvested or weathered out of 
soils even under low-intensity systems could be very high (and higher than those 
currently paid) (Van Der Vossen, 2005). Barham & Weber (2012) also suggest that 
denying growers recourse to inorganic fertilizers could limit the poverty-reducing 
potential of coffee production, mainly because yields tend to have a greater impact on 
incomes than price premiums. 
The literature is missing a discussion and calculation of post-harvest processing 
costs. While these are likely to be a smaller proportion of overall costs, certified 
producers might also face additional production costs in achieving the level of coffee 
quality demanded by certified markets (Barham & Weber, 2012).  
 Although in the depths of the coffee crisis in the early 2000s, farmers might have 
been earning negative net incomes (Bacon, 2005), coffee production tends to be 
profitable for both organic and conventional smallholders. Some authors found that 
overall net incomes were higher for conventional growers than organic and Fair Trade-
                                                 
7 Valkila (2009) also raises the question of the nature of labor in organic fertilization, which could be 
construed as an inconvenient truth. These processes are carried out through “back-breaking shoveling and 
carrying of heavy sacks of organic materials with no mechanical assistance.” 
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certified ones (Beuchelt & Zeller, 2011). Beuchelt & Zeller (2011) attribute lower net 
incomes to both high labor costs and smaller coffee areas. Lyngbaek et al. (2001) found 
that net incomes were similar between the two groups, although slightly higher for 
conventional growers. (US $1,448 +/- 359 for organic vs. $1,483 per hectare for 
conventional). 
 While profitability is one metric for the economic sustainability of organic 
production systems, in this context, profitability is not a proxy for sustainable incomes. A 
simple calculation, based on the results in Valkila (2009), would show that although 
“average” Fair Trade organic production was profitable in “low” market conditions, for a 
household of 4 adult-equivalents specialized in coffee to earn $1.25 per capita per day 
under these conditions, they would need to farm about 7 hectares of coffee. As noted in 
the article, 80 percent of Nicaraguan coffee producers had less than 3.5 hectares of 
coffee. Only in “high” market conditions, would they be able to reach the poverty line on 
approximately 3.4 hectares, despite involvement in certified niche markets.  
 In Beuchelt & Zeller (2011), organic growers had an average per capita income 
below the national poverty line, while average organic-fairtrade and conventional 
producers were above the poverty line. However, this glossed over considerable 
heterogeneity and Fair Trade and organic certified producers were more likely to be 
below the extreme poverty line than their counterparts, 45 percent compared to 33 
percent, respectively. Bacon (2008) found that certified growers earned $137.73 per 
person per year in an average household ($0.38 per day). As Barham & Weber (2012) 
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points out, the gross income gains can be small compared to remittances from local 
migration, and very small compared to remittances from international migration. 
 There are several reasons why the accuracy of findings in the existing literature 
might be questioned. Since coffee yields can vacillate from year-to-year, it is important 
that studies average yields between at least two seasons. While some studies reviewed 
accomplished this (Lyngbaek et al. (2001) collected data over a 3-year period), others 
relied on single-year data (Barham & Weber, 2012). 
 While most studies used survey data, some studies used simplified estimates of 
costs of production from national institutions (Valkila, 2009) or, in one case, used 
national minimum wages as an assumed opportunity cost (Ruiz Meza, 2014b). Others 
have reported on production, costs and sales data from surveys, but do not present a list 
of disaggregated costs (Gobbi, 2000), so it’s unclear whether all costs are accounted for.  
 Barham & Weber (2012) also raises that point that, although higher yields among 
organic and organized growers could derive from better management practices, resulting 
from cooperative technical assistance, they could also be related to a “selection effect” 
where better-performing farmers are more attracted to alternative markets than poorer-
performing ones 
 Many of these studies leave out fixed costs (Bacon et al., 2008; Barham & Weber, 
2012; Lyngbæk et al., 2001). In Lyngbaek et al. (2001), “[f]ixed costs…were neither 
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recorded nor could they be estimated by the majority of the producers.”8 Only Beuchelt 
& Zeller (2011) incorporated the depreciation of the coffee bean de-pulper. Most of the 
studies also do not consider the extent to which households commit their own labor to 
coffee production (Barham & Weber, 2012).  
 In some cases, the age of the data might limit the applicability of the study’s 
conclusion. For instance, the data used in Gobbi (2000) are now nearly two decades old 
and from an era before the coffee crisis era. In the wake of coffee leaf rust, prices for 
conventional producers might increase as they incorporate routine applications of 
fungicides. On the other hand, yield increases might be expected as a result of technical 
assistance.  
 Finally, coffee incomes are not a sufficient proxy for household welfare or 
broader sustainability. For one, diversified coffee agroecosystems, farms and rural 
livelihoods offer other products or services that fulfill household needs and earn cash 
incomes (Méndez et al., 2010). There have been few attempts to quantify these auxiliary 
products and activities among Mesoamerican farmers since it is a complicated endeavor 
(Gobbi, 2000). It has not been tackled here; the coffee farmers interviewed in this study 
considered coffee the principal base of their livelihoods and there is the risk of over-
emphasizing the economic impact of alternative crops and products, outside of milpa and 
cardamom. Such accounting also does not account for other impacts of participation in 
                                                 
8 Lyngbaek et al. (2001) refers to a figure from the National Coffee Institute of Costa Rica (ICAFE) that 
fixed costs made up 29% of total costs, but the authors determined that this figure was not representative of 
the less-capitalized systems of smallholders, and in the end suggested that fixed costs in these systems 
might be insignificant. 
 72 
 
certified markets, such as livelihood outcomes, such as education, which are related to 
both net income and the social premium received and distributed by coffee cooperatives 
(Barham & Weber, 2012). Nor does it attempt to quantify positive externalities, such as 
down-stream water quality. Coffee agroecosystems have been promoted for their 
environmental sustainability, in contrast with alternative land uses such as maize 
production, pasture and logging. Coffee agroecosystems conserve critical ecosystem 
goods and services (Bray et al., 2008). 
4.3. Material and Methods 
 
In contrast to using estimated costs from other sources, collecting real on-farm 
data could provide for more reliable results since it “captures details and subtleties not 
available from traditional budgets” (Conner & Rangarajan, 2009). Highly detailed farm 
records are the most useful source of information in creating accurate representations of 
enterprise budgets (Conner & Rangarajan, 2009).  
The first round interviews in July 2015 included a visit to the plots maintained by 
each of the organic growers9 (OG) and conventional growers (CG) in order to collect soil 
                                                 
9 It is important to emphasize here that while we refer to these growers as “organic” and “conventional,” 
many organic growers also derive benefits from belonging to cooperatives, as well as greater involvement 
in development projects, in which their buyers could be contributors. Beyond price premiums, cooperative 
membership and participation in development projects will have an effect on yields and production costs 
through support mechanisms such as technical assistance, lower credit barriers and cost-shares (particularly 
for infrastructure). The latter was true of the organic growers in this study, who received financial support 
for purchasing materials to construct concrete post-harvest processing centers, or beneficios. In other 
words, the accounting analyzed in this study is not only the result of better prices and practices, all else 
equal, but instead results also from confounding factors that stem from participation in cooperatives. In 
addition, participation in cooperatives and organic production can offer non-monetary benefits that fulfill 
the non-financial aspects of multidimensional livelihoods. Beyond prices and cost-savings, involvement in 
organic agriculture can contribute to human development, which in turn promotes poverty reduction, by 
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and soil cover data. To save time, photos were taken of handwritten farmer notebooks 
kept by OGs. These notebooks are a requirement for Fair Trade certification. CGs did not 
keep farm records. Data was also collected through interviews regarding the nature of 
practices and equipment costs. 
 We collected data on five growing seasons – from 2010-2011 to 2014-2015 - 
although only data from the previous two years was used in the following analysis10.  
Using multi-year data helps to control for the production cycles of coffee, which can 
produce heavily one year and then much less the next (Gobbi, 2000), and improve the 
reliability of the results. It was also hoped that the effect of coffee leaf rust would be 
apparent since the collected records included the 2010-2011 harvest, and the disease had 
not begun to affect crops in this area until 2012.  
After the notebooks were transcribed into Microsoft Excel spreadsheets, there was 
a second round of visits in August 2015 to organic growers, who were asked to a) verify 
the information, b) fill in the gaps by estimating reasonable values and c) estimate how 
much of the labor was contracted and how much was assumed by the family (CGs had 
provided the latter in the first round of interviews).  
                                                 
promoting processes of learning, experimentation and knowledge-sharing (Ayuya et al., 2015). Of course, 
this human development is especially effective when coupled with higher economic returns. 
10 Since coffee harvests end in the first months of the year, for the purposes of this study, the production 
cycles used in this study began with maintenance in January and finished at the end of the harvest the 
following March, such that they overlapped temporally with the following cycle. 
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 ASOBAGRI’s purchase records were used to calculate precise yield and price 
figures for organic growers11. Certification costs and taxes were borne indirectly by 
cooperative members, since the price they ultimately received for their coffee harvest had 
already accounted (i.e. paid) for certification fees and taxes. 
The fact that conventional growers suffered greater losses as a result of coffee leaf 
rust presented a challenge for comparing enterprise budgets. In this case, we used a figure 
that appears to represent what a typical conventional yield might have been: 3500 pounds 
per hectare, which was CG2’s last yield before the onset of coffee leaf rust disease. Prices 
in mainstream markets (where CGs sold their coffee) were drawn from records collected 
from a local intermediary, which showed his prices at 15-day intervals over five years. To 
create CG budgets, these prices were averaged to produce a single annual price. This 
simplification is a pragmatic one since “comparing Fair Trade organic prices with 
conventional prices in the mainstream market is overcomplicated because coffee prices 
are volatile” (Valkila, 2009, p. 3022). Such volatility is visible in Figure 4.5. All land 
                                                 
11 This study also assumes that growers sold their entire yield to the cooperative, while other research has 
indicated that cooperative growers will often sell some of their coffee to low-paying middlemen. In some 
cases, growers will do this because they are not paid the higher prices for certified coffee until months after 
delivery to the cooperative (i.e. until after the cooperative has sold the coffee and received payment). In 
these cases, growers might sell to local intermediaries for immediate cash (C. Bacon, 2005). This is 
probably true where the cooperative itself has a low level of financial capital and/or there is some 
uncertainty as to whether the cooperative can sell all of its supply. With our growers, the cooperative seems 
to resolve this by paying a slightly higher price than local intermediaries upon delivery, and then a smaller 
premium in the second installment, suggesting sufficient financial reserves or credit access and more stable 
relationships with buyers. Farmers might also be tempted to sell coffee futures to intermediaries 
(cooperatives typically are not able to purchase these) for immediate household needs, especially in cases 
of shortfalls in grain yields, or to cover unexpected expenses (Bacon, 2014). We do not know if the growers 
in this study were engaged in such transactions. 
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measurements have been converted from cuerdas to hectares (ha)12, and all prices were 
converted from Guatemalan Quetzales (Q) into U.S. dollars ($)13.  
It was determined that the main costs of production categories would theoretically 
include those listed in Table 4.1. Average costs for each category are recorded or 
estimated, after which they are entered into an enterprise budget. The interviews did not 
collect data on financing or participation costs and fell short of capturing accurate and 
comparable data on land acquisition costs. Since opportunity costs were not calculated 
here and participation costs are mainly family labor (with some smaller transportation 
costs), these would only impact effective wages in our analysis. For that purpose, five 
days per year were added to family labor for OGs for participation in cooperative 
activities. 
Table 4.1. 
Coffee production cost categories 
land acquisition 
coffee orchard establishment 
first three years of orchard maintenance1 
orchard maintenance (including equipment depreciation) 
harvesting  




participation in cooperative activities 
Notes. 1The costs of the first three years would need to be amortized over the remaining productive life of 
the plot because plants have a three-year maturity period before they begin producing beans. Since OG1 
estimated that the productive life of coffee trees seemed to be about 20 years, the establishment costs were 
                                                 
12 Growers measure their plots using cuerdas as units. To convert cuerdas to hectares, the cooperative 
records used the ratio of 22.5 cuerdas : 1 hectare, and that is the same ratio used here. 
13 Taking into account changes in the exchange rate, the price in Guatemalan Quetzals (Q) was divided by 
the average of exchange rates on January 1 and June 1 of each year. Rates of conversion for ’13-’14 and 




distributed over 20 years. To estimate a typical value for these costs, the average cost of weeding in 2013 
and 2014 was used. 
OG3 provided calculations for average orchard establishment costs (shown in 
Table 4.2. These results are extrapolated to all growers in their enterprise budgets. Plot 
maintenance cost categories include weeding, pruning and de-suckering, shade 
management, terracing, soil amendment production and application, and pest and disease 
control. Prices for inputs were collected from local input suppliers in Barillas. Since 
harvest labor is paid per quintal, or according to the weight of coffee cherries harvested, 
harvest costs were calculated by multiplying self-reported wages by estimated yields at 
coffee cherry weight (yields are usually reported at parchment or green (dried) coffee 
weight. For the purpose of this study, we convert our figures for parchment coffee yields 
to coffee cherry weight with the ratio of 5.10:1.00, coffee cherries:parchment (dried) 
coffee, as demonstrated by OG4’s records. 
Table 4.2.    
  
Orchard establishment costs from OG3 
 Price Unit Quantity Total  
Coffee plants $0.19 tree 4050 $775.00  
Staking and hole-digging $6.38 day 90 $573.75  
Planting $6.38 day 45 $286.88  
Total    $1,635.63 per hectare 
Note. Prices were converted using the exchange rate 1 Q : 0.1275 USD on the day of the interview. 






Figure 4.1. Farmer record showing ratio of cherry yield weight to parchment weight 
 Due to the spottiness of the data on post-harvest processing infrastructure from 
the interviews, we requested that the cooperative estimate the cost of construction, 
depreciation and repairs for a typical beneficio. An image of their response is included in 
Appendix G and a table based on this response is included in Appendix H. For growers 
using only a hand-crank pulper or wooden fermentation boxes and drying trays, we either 
used the figures they gave or extrapolated costs from the cooperative; for example, the 
cooperative’s cost of a pulper was attributed to a hand-crank pulper minus costs 
associated with the motor. Although some growers had their own truck, a single formula 
was used to calculate transportation costs: local transport fee rates ($1.34 per 100-pound 
sack) multiplied by yields.   
To determine the extent to which coffee incomes contributed to poverty 
alleviation, net income was divided into per day per capita net income, assuming a 
household included a family with two adults and three children (children were counted as 
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0.7 adult-equivalents)14. Per capita income was compared to both the national poverty 
line15 (published by ENCOVI in 2011), as well as the international poverty line used by 
institutions like the World Bank16, both adjusted for national inflation rates and averaged 
over the two growing seasons (World Bank, 2015). The national threshold was used 
because “a country’s national poverty line is far more appropriate [than international 
estimates] for underpinning policy dialogue or targeting programs to reach the poorest” 
(World Bank, 2015). We also attempted to show how either plot sizes, prices or 
productivity levels would need to change (independent of other factors) for growers to 
attain coffee incomes equal to the national poverty threshold, under current conditions, 
although these adjustments are admittedly basic. 
4.4. Results 
 
 The small farms or “plots” in Nueva Esperanza resulted from the gradual division 
of a larger farm in the 1980s when the land, which to that point had been kept in forest 
because of its marginal quality, was sold off at low prices to farmworkers (See Figure 
3.2. for location of community on map). Many of these farmworkers had been displaced 
from their previous communities by the violence that erupted between large landowners, 
                                                 
14 This is smaller than regional average household sizes of 5.3 members (Huehuetenango) and 5.4 members 
(El Quiché) (ENCOVI, 2015), but it is unclear how these averages count children. 
15 The national poverty threshold is an absolute (as opposed to relative) poverty line, which refers to the 
minimum necessary cost that covers a basic basket of food and non-food necessities. Poverty refers to 
being unable to afford such a basket. Extreme poverty refers to those who are unable to achieve their food 
costs, whereas general poverty refers to those who can cover their food costs, but do not sufficiently attain 
additional basic non-food goods and services. The methodology is drawn from that used by the World Bank 
(ENCOVI, 2015). 
16 $1.90 PPP per day per capita for extreme poverty (using 2011 prices). $3.10 PPP per day per capita for 
general poverty (using 2011 prices). 
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the national army and opposition guerillas. They built new homes close to their recently 
purchased holdings, and the new settlement became the village of Nueva Esperanza. 
 Table 4.3. includes characteristics of the seven plots covered in this study. A 
grower history is also included in Appendix D. In general, shade percentages among this 
study’s participants were much lower than those found among growers in Chiapas, 
Mexico in Soto-Pinto et al (2000), where average shade cover was 46.7 percent. Planting 
densities for OG1, OG2 and OG3 were also higher than those in the mentioned study, 
where the average density was 1927 trees per hectare. 
Table 4.3.       
Characteristics of coffee plots studied 






OG1 1.34 12years (60) 
16 years (40) 
Caturra (70) 
Catuai (30) 
4050 22 1219 
OG2 1.34 8 years (100) Villalobos (95) 
Caturra (5) 
3375 10 817 
OG3 1.56 16 years (100) Villalobos (100) 4050 4  980 
OG4 1.07 20+ years (50) 





-- 17 1193 
CG1 0.71 15 years (100) Caturra (100) -- 7 908 
CG2 1.56  20+ years (100) Caturra (100) -- 15 950 
CG3 0.27 10 years (100) Caturra (100) -- 7 865 
 
 A table outlining the different practices of the growers in this study is available in 
the Appendix F. Surprisingly, conventional growers had decided to return to manual 
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weeding, rather than continue using glyphosate herbicides. It was unclear whether this 
was for economic reasons or disappointment with the results of herbicide application. 
Both OGs and CGs engaged in pruning and shade management, although OGs were more 
likely to do these practices twice a year and CGs only once. Terracing and live barriers 
have become familiar practices, through outreach of cooperative extension agents (to 
OGs) and Anacafé extension agents (who serve both groups). Anacafé wrote on soil 
conservation in its July – September, 2013 edition of El Cafetal, its quarterly publication 
(Peña, 2013). Nevertheless, OGs in this study were using one or both technologies, while 
CG1 and CG2 had been less willing or able to apply them.  
 OGs made and applied compost as a requirement for certification, although their 
application rates varied widely17. They had also applied lime, although three of the four 
OGs had first applied it in the last couple years (OG3 had been applying it bi-annually for 
some time). CGs used granulated fertilizers at different rates. They also applied a foliar 
fertilizer, which they mixed with a fungicide during fumigations to control for coffee leaf 
rust. OG2 and OG3 did not have an issue with coffee leaf rust because they already grew 
resistant varieties. OG4 had avoided major losses from leaf rust probably because his plot 
is isolated and at a higher altitude. Although OG1 had losses from leaf rust, he was not 
using a control. (The cooperative had recently begun to promote a biological control 
called Royano© and was also trying to fabricate its own control using a Royano©-
                                                 
17 OGs’ fertilizer application rates ranged from 0.5 to 5 pounds per tree with an application frequency 
ranging from every 4 to 6 years (smallholders typically only fertilize a portion of their plot every year), so 




inoculated tea.) Ojo de gallo, another common though less pernicious disease, was 
controlled through shade management by both groups. Broca, a common insect pest was 
not a major issue, and could be controlled manually (i.e. picking infested cherries) 
without a significant labor investment.  
 OGs and CGs differed in their post-harvest processing infrastructure, with OGs 
mainly using motorized pulpers and cement fermentation tanks, washing channels and 
patios (OG3 had recently begun to dry on wooden trays after years with a cement patio) 
and CG1 and CG2 using hand-crank pulpers and fermenting in wooden boxes and drying 
on wooden trays. CG3 had a similar set-up as OGs. It is unclear whether the OGs access 
to cement infrastructure had anything to do with higher quality requirements. Three had 
built their tanks through a cooperative-run project funded by USAID. 
Table 4.4. shows the productivity and total yields for organic growers. Although 
in the interviews, organic growers indicated that they could attain yields of 3375 – 4500 
pounds per hectare (especially when plants were young), all OG yields fell below this 
range. Two points are obvious from organic growers’ yield data. First, there was some 
variation in productivity among the four organic growers, with the OG1’s plot yielding 
nearly half the total average. These results could be at least partly explained by the effect 
of coffee leaf rust. Figure 4.2. shows the trend in productivity among the four organic 
growers with OG1’s productivity shown in black. OG1’s plot was mainly Caturra, which 
is known to be especially susceptible to coffee leaf rust, whereas the plots of OG2 and 
OG3, who had higher average yields, were planted mainly in Villalobos, thought to be a 
disease-resistant variety. Conventional growers, meanwhile, reported yields that indicate 
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precipitous losses due to coffee leaf rust disease (all three grew only Caturra) (Figure 
4.3.)  
Table 4.4.          
Productivity in pounds per hectare (and total yields) for organic growers for ’13-’14 and ’14-
’15 harvest periods  
 2013-2014 Harvest 2014-2015 Harvest 2-year Average Harvest 
Organic Grower 1  1737.50 (2317)       741.75   (989)  1239.63 (1653.0)  
Organic Grower 2  3315.00 (4420)  3129.00  (4172)  3222.00 (4296.0)  
Organic Grower 3  2143.99 (3335)  3222.00 (5012)  2683.00 (4173.5)  
Organic Grower 4  2143.16 (2286)  2156.25 (2300)  2149.71 (2293.0)  






































Figure 4.3. Yield trends for organic and conventional growers over five seasons 
 
Whereas the price advantage for OGs appears very small when compared to 
“average prices” received by all types of Guatemalan producers, as reported by the 
International Coffee Organization (ICO) (Figure 4.4.), the price advantage is much more 
obvious when compared to local mainstream market prices in Barillas (Figure 4.5.)18. The 
                                                 
18ASOBAGRI pays for members’ coffee in two installments. First, they pay growers upon receipt (many 
growers make several deliveries to the cooperative warehouse throughout the harvest) at a price that 
fluctuates according to the market. The president of the cooperative told me this usually turns out to be 
about 6.7 cents (USD) higher per pound than the local market price. The cooperative generally classifies 
coffee into three separate quality grades, according to altitude: Semi-hard, Hard and Strictly Hard. Semi-
hard receives a slightly lower price than the latter two. In some cases, they will pay lower prices if the 
quality is less than adequate (usually as a result of poor post-harvest processing) and, in even fewer cases, 
they have paid more for micro-lots from growers with a reputation (or with varieties that offer) supreme 
quality.  
The second installment is paid out of the profits earned by the cooperative. The amount of profits returned 
to members is decided on in a lengthy assembly of member representatives, where the cooperative 
administration tends to push back against returning all profits to growers while representatives tend to 
demand as much returned as possible. (The head of commercialization for the cooperative told me that the 
cooperative would have more recourse to its own financial resources (and would not have to borrow as 
much) if grower representatives distributed a more moderate percentage of profits to growers, but it was 
almost impossible for the administration to persuade the assembly to accept this argument.) Originally, 
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isolation of these communities could partly explain why the cooperative price provides an 
incentive despite their similarity to aggregated (i.e. including large-scale, conventional 
farmers) national averages.   
                                                 
More recently, the cooperative has split growers into two groups, so as to not “punish” growers who 
happened to sell when the market was good by distributing most of the profits to growers who delivered 
when the market happened to be worse (these are shown in Figure 4.4., indicated by Group A and B). 
 
 
Figure 4.4. Comparison between ASOBAGRI’s final prices and ICO’s Average “Prices to 
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Figure 4.5. Cooperative prices and a local intermediary’s prices over five years 
 Another surprising finding of this study was that CGs committed had higher 
production costs and committed more family labor to coffee production and 
processing than OGs, on average. Among the participants, orchard maintenance costs 
were much higher for an average conventional grower than for an organic grower. 
Overall, the average organic grower paid less for contracted labor than the average 
conventional grower, even while CGs tended to pay wages at the lower end of the range 
(OG1 also paid low wages)19 (Figure 4.5.). However, when CG3 is removed, the average 
conventional grower paid less ($193.79 (CG) vs. $277.32 (OG)). Organic growers did 
commit more family labor to orchard maintenance, on average, but the differences are 
much smaller when OG3 is removed, and even reversed if CG3 is additionally removed. 
                                                 
19 It is worthwhile to note here that agricultural wages were far below the national minimum daily wage of 
Q78.72, or $10.55 (in 2015) (Acuerdo Gubernativo No. 470-2014). Other studies of coffee production costs 
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This surprising similarity in labor investments is probably mostly due to the fact that 
conventional growers were weeding manually (or were planning to weed manually) and 
had the additional cost of fungicide applications.  
Table 4.5. 
      
Two-year average orchard maintenance costs per hectare (in USD) 
 Inputs  Contracted labor Total 
OG1 78.99  212.70 291.69 
OG2 118.50  320.71 439.21 
OG3 352.48  250.97 603.46 
OG4 104.04  324.90 428.94 
Average OG 163.50  277.32 440.83 
CG1 860.56  133.87 994.43 
CG2 203.37  253.71 457.08 
CG3 1372.43  699.08 2071.51 
Average CG 812.12  362.22 1174.34 
Note. Results not adjusted for inflation. 3500 pounds/ha used for conventional grower yield.  
 
Table 4.6.   
Wages paid by growers 
 Organic growers Conventional growers 
Weeding  $4.02 - 6.07 per cuerda $4.02 - $5.36 per cuerda 
Pruning  $4.02 - 5.36 per day --  
Shade management  $4.69 - 6.07 per day $4.69   
Terracing $4.69 - 10.72 per cuerda $10.72  per cuerda 
Compost application $4.02 - 4.69 per day $3.35  per day, or 
   $6.07  per 100-lb. sack 
Fumigating --  $4.69  per day 
Harvest  $6.07  per 100-lb. sack $6.07  per 100-lb. sack 
 
 The conventional growers in this study paid more for inputs. Granulated fertilizer 
costs were especially high. Conventional growers also mixed a foliar fertilizer in with the 
fungicide spray they used to control for coffee leaf rust. They also purchased an adjuvant 
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to help the foliar/fungicide mixture to stick longer on the leaves. Although a common 
glyphosate herbicide was not included in the costs in this study as a result of growers’ 
preferences, it was a relatively cheap input compared with the fertilizer and the fungicide.  
 Organic growers were applying lime to their soils and the cost of liming was 
considerable. In the year that the surveys were conducted (in fact, during the week of 
surveying), OG1 had also begun applying Ferticonsa, a brand of composted chicken 
manure approved for organic production, but this cost did not fall within the growing 
seasons studied. The cooperative had also begun supplying a foliar fertilizer, but none of 
the OGs had tried it, and a coffee leaf rust biological control (OG1 had applied to his 
father’s plot the year of the surveys, but not to his own plot). 
Table 4.7. 
Products used by conventional smallholder coffee growers in this study (N = 3) 
Name Company Uses Price Unit 
21-7-14 Disagro Fertilizer $29.49 100 lbs.-sack 
15-15-15 Disagro Fertilizer $29.49 100 lbs.-sack 
Bayfolan Forte Bayer Foliar Fertilizer $8.04 Liter 
Alto 10 SL Syngenta Fungicide $77.75 Liter 
Affix Agriavances Adjuvant $10.05 Liter 
Glifosato Monsanto Herbicide $8.04 Liter 
     
 Due to larger harvests, CGs spent more on harvest labor and committed more of 
their family labor to harvest20. OG4 and CG3 contracted all their harvest labor, while they 
                                                 
20 It was assumed that OG1, OG2 and CG1 invested the same amount of family labor to harvests as OG3; 
these growers all had some access to family labor. It is possible, of course, that the ratios for OG1, OG2 
and CG1 are actually quite different. OG4, who did not have recourse to additional family labor, indicated 
that he contracted all of his harvest labor (he himself managed the post-harvest processing during 
harvesting). In reality, OG1 might have contracted less labor than assumed here, especially during the very 




operated the post-harvest processing. The rest of the participants committed some 
percentage of their family labor. Since this data point was missing in three cases, OG3’s 
rough estimate of contracting three-quarters of harvest labor was extrapolated to other 
families.  
 It would appear that the depreciation of (and repairs to) post-harvest processing 
infrastructure accounts for a third of annual production costs for OGs and 7.6 percent of 
annual productions costs for CGs. This large difference is due to both CGs’ smaller 
investments in post-harvest infrastructure and larger overall costs. There is probably also 
a difference in labor requirements between the different forms of processing with those 
drying on trays (and repairing trays) committing more labor, but there was not sufficient 
data to speculate on how many more labor-days are spent on these activities. The 
participants gave widely ranging estimates for the cost of gas to operate the motorized 
pulpers (from 1 gallon per 3,000 pounds (OG2) to 8 gallons per 5,000 pounds (OG3), but 
these costs, as well as the annual cost of oil for the pulper motor were relatively 
miniscule. For the final analysis, two gallons of gas and one bottle of oil were assumed 
for all growers. 
 When labor costs and input costs for orchard maintenance are combined, CGs’ 
production costs are higher, on average, even when CG3 (who had exceptionally high 
per-hectare costs) is removed. Only OG3 had higher production costs than CG2, the 
conventional grower with the lowest production costs. 
 A summary of average revenue, costs of production and profits is provided in 
Table 4.8. On a per-hectare basis, the average CG earned almost 20 percent more than the 
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average OG ($2,071.68 and $1,737.67, respectively). On the other hand, OGs were more 
profitable in terms of percentage over costs and were more profitable overall (due to 
larger plot sizes). These averages gloss over large variations among the growers, as 
shown in Table 4.9. 
 OGs, on average, had a lower effective wage than CGs on a per-hectare basis (but 
a higher effective wage in reference to actual plot sizes) since they committed slightly 
more of their own labor, on average. CG3’s actual effective wage was very low. Due to 
his tiny landholding, he is likely investing the brunt of his labor in other activities. In fact, 
CG3 owns a store in the community (although the returns to this economic activity are 
considered to be relatively slim). For all growers besides CG3, the total returns to family 
labor were above local wages for agricultural labor (and for OG2 and CG2, they were 
much higher). If a typical agricultural wage could be estimated at $4.69 per day, OG2 
earned an effective wage more than 10 times what he would earn as a laborer, and CG2 
earned an effective wage more than 12 times higher. CG3, on the other hand, earned an 
effective wage below a laborer’s earnings. 
Table 4.8.    
Per-hectare average and grower-specific effective wages 
 Family labor-days Per-hectare effective wage Actual effective wage 
Average OG 104.1 $17.53 $23.32 
Average CG 84.8 $24.43 $20.77 
OG1 85.6 $7.52 $10.03 
OG2 83.6 $36.90 $47.98 
CG2 112.6 $26.97 $58.62 





 Table 4.9.  
Per-hectare revenues, costs of production and profits 
 Average OG Average CG  OG1 OG2 CG2 CG3 
Revenue            
     Yield 2434.96 3500  1239.63 3222 3500 3500 
     Price $1.52  $1.33   $1.53  $1.51  1.33 1.33 
     Total revenue $3,536.63  $4,637.50   $1,896.94  $4,875.32 $4,637.50  $4,637.50  
Costs            
     Land acquisition costs -- --  -- -- -- -- 
     Orchard establishment costs1 $84.78  $84.78   $84.78 $84.78 $84.78 $84.78 
     First 3 years maintenance 
costs2 
$29.39  $49.44  
 
$10.35  $17.74  $37.80 $63.00 
     Orchard maintenance costs $440.83  $1,174.34   $291.69  $439.21  $457.08 $2,071.51 
     Harvest labor $624.50  $913.90   $311.73  $814.19  $842.86 $1,013.84 
     Oil and gas to operate pulper $12.57  $12.57   $12.57  $12.57  $12.57 $12.57 
     Post-harvest infrastructure3 $576.18  $284.52   $563.05  $563.05  $118.99 $615.57 
     Transportation to market $30.72  $46.27   $16.62  $43.19  $46.27  $46.27  
     Loan service -- --  -- --   
     Participation costs -- None  -- -- none None 
     Total costs $1,798.96  $2,565.82   $1,290.79  $1,974.73  $1,600.35  $3,907.54  
Profit            
     Per-hectare profit $1,737.67  $2,071.68   $606.15  $2,900.59  $3,037.15  $729.96  
     Percent profit 96.59% 80.74%  46.96% 146.88% 189.78% 18.68% 
     Actual profit $2,311.09  $1,760.93   $808.20  $3,867.45  $4,724.45  $194.66  
Note. 1Amortized over 20 years. 2Amortized over 17 years. 3Depreciation rates and annual repairs 
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 The average international poverty lines calculated for the two-year period were 
$2.15 per capita per day for extreme poverty and $3.51 per capita per day for general 
poverty. The national extreme poverty line was incredibly close to the international one at 
$2.11 per capita per day. The national general poverty line, however, was higher than the 
international one at $3.75 per capita per day. These poverty lines are include in the graph 
in Figure 4.6. 
Despite the fact that all growers earned a profit in the previous two seasons, no 
one earned a an actual profit that was at or above general poverty thresholds, although 
CG2’s actual profit was close. On average, net income from a hectare of coffee 
production (i.e. profit) was far below the extreme poverty thresholds for both groups. 
OGs were able to come closer to the extreme poverty thresholds, on average, probably 
due to their larger average plot sizes. However, performance defined-as-such was highly 
variable among growers, as demonstrated in Figure 4.6. Some growers appeared to be 
able to surpass the extreme poverty threshold and even approach the general poverty 
threshold (eg. OG2 and CG2), whereas other growers struggled to achieve an income at 
25 percent of the extreme poverty line (eg. OG1 and CG3).  
 For OGs, on average, coffee income would equal the poverty threshold if growers 
increased their plot sizes to 2.93 hectares, or received a $2.83 per-pound price for coffee, 
or attained a productivity level of over 4,500 pounds per hectare (the locally-perceived 
upper limit for organic production). For CGs, on average, the same income level would 
require a 2.46-hectare plot size, or a $2.19 per-pound price for coffee, or a productivity 
level of over 5,700 pounds per hectare.  
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Again, these figures varied according to the grower. Both OG2 and CG2 would 
only require a slight increase in plot size, or average prices that are, while relatively high, 
not inconceivable. On average, however, prices would need to increase significantly. The 
ideal productivity level is lowest for OG1 (although his yields would have to be much 
higher than he was currently turning out), since he received a higher premium for his 
high-altitude coffee. But if his productivity remained low, he would be required to 
increase his plot size by a factor of 6 or secure the unrealistic price of $5.15 per-pound. 
CG3, whose plot was only 0.27 hectares, would need to cultivate almost 7 hectares of 
coffee, increase his per-pound price by over a dollar or produce at more than 6,700 
pounds per hectare. 
 
Figure 4.6. Comparison of coffee net incomes to international and national poverty thresholds 
Note. 1Assumes household is 2 adults and 3 children, or 4.1 adult-equivalents. 2International national 
poverty threshold from 2013 and national poverty threshold from 2011 adjusted for inflation and 
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Table 4.10.  
      
Changes in plot size, price or productivity necessary to achieve national poverty threshold 
   Avg. OG 
Avg. 
CG 
 OG1 OG2 CG2 CG3 
Plot size (ha) 2.93 2.46 8.40 1.75 1.68 6.97 
Price1 
$2.83  $2.19  $5.15  $2.19  $1.91  $2.57  
Productivity (lbs/ha)1 
4,532.34  5,756.40  4,170.57  4,678.76  5,030.48  6,765.21  
Notes. 1Using the value for per-hectare income 
 
4.5. Discussion 
Having accurate data on current revenues and production costs can be especially 
useful when predicting the economic impact of new agricultural practices and alternative 
activities. The project under which this research was funded was primarily focused on the 
agroecological practices or diversification strategies that could contribute to smallholder 
resilience to predicted climatic change. These practices are likely to increase costs and 
the economic impact should be measured at the level of detail demonstrated above.  
Incorporation of productive shade into coffee agroforestry systems is a common 
recommendation that can contribute biophysical benefits to coffee production and 
socioeconomic benefits for smallholders. Based on the interviews here, promoting 
increased shade would be a tough sell, since many growers have adjusted their shade 
levels over time to control ojo de gallo and, more recently, coffee leaf rust disease. 
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Certifications demanding higher levels of shade should take into account not only lower 
yields, but also the input and labor costs of controlling for these coffee plant diseases.  
Currently, ASOBAGRI certifies some of its grower as Bird-Friendly, which has 
higher shade requirements, but the cooperative does not pay a higher premium to these 
growers. This is due in part to the dynamics of democratic decision-making (Bird-
Friendly-certified growers are a minority within the cooperative, and are not necessarily 
represented sufficiently at the assemblies).  
 Similarly, interventions that promote livelihood diversification should consider 
how those activities will interact with the economics of smallholder coffee production, 
particularly since coffee growers might still perceive coffee production as their best 
option in the future (see Chapter 3). To what extent will the activity make up for the 
shortfall between current coffee incomes and national poverty thresholds? If resources 
and labor are de-committed from coffee production, how do the opportunity costs 
between these alternative investments compare, and what is the overall outcome? 
Lacking detailed budgetary information, interventions promoting livelihood 
diversification strategies among coffee growers are operating much more “in the dark” 
than is necessary.  
 Compared to other studies in the literature (Figure 4.6.), organic yields among our 
respondents were higher than expected (and were highest when OG1 was removed). This 
might be due to a confluence of factors, including adoption of improved varieties and 
lower levels of shade, as well as measurement errors (explained below). It does, however, 
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lead to some doubt as to whether, in this case, further intensification of coffee production 
can lead to large improvements in yields, and therefore in net incomes. 
 
Figure 4.7. Comparison between organic coffee yields in literature and this study 
Note. Yields presented here include green coffee and parchment coffee weights. These are 
undifferentiated. 
 The two-year average farmgate price premium for OGs was slightly over 14 
percent. This was higher than that found in Barham & Weber (2012) (7.4 percent) but 
less than the mean premium found in Lyngbaek et al. (2001) (20 percent). It is difficult to 






















vary year-to-year, typically growing when market prices drop21 (Van Der Vossen, 2005). 
In addition, farmgate premiums are usually the difference between market premiums and 
cooperative management costs (Valkila, 2009), so they could be expected to vary across 
different cooperatives even within the same year depending on cooperative structure and 
efficiency. 
 Surprisingly, CGs had much higher overall production costs than OGs, spending 
35 percent more on production and processing, on average. Other research has reported 
that organic production costs were five to seven percent higher, mainly due to high labor 
costs (Van Der Vossen, 2005). The difference from previous research could be due to the 
fact that CGs in this study were weeding manually, instead of using herbicides, a point 
where costs might diverge between OGs and CGs in other scenarios. They also had the 
added cost of fungicide applications to control for coffee leaf rust disease. Other studies 
have found that organic growers have lower weeding costs possibly due to higher levels 
of shade (Lyngbaek et al. (2001); in this case, weeding practices (and shade coverage) 
were relatively similar. Also, in contrast to Lyngbaek et al. (2001) organic growers spent 
more time on pruning and shade management, even though they also committed labor to 
compost production.  
Although family labor was not attributed a monetary value here, CGs spent more 
on contracted labor. Other research has shown that organic growers have higher family-
labor requirements (Beuchelt & Zeller, 2011), but that was not witnessed here. Also, 
                                                 
21 In Valkila (2009), the organic farmgate premium was 30.5 percent in 2005 when mainstream prices were 
low and 7.6 percent in 2008 when the market recovered. 
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labor costs were dwarfed by the input costs of CGs, which were nearly 4 times higher, 
with fertilizer being particularly expensive, but also with the added application of 
fungicides in the wake of coffee leaf rust. Beuchelt & Zeller (2011) found smaller 
differences between input costs between conventional and organic-fairtrade growers 
($47.60 ± $85.00 per-hectare vs. $24.10 ± $63.50 per-hectare). 
 Another interesting conclusion of this study that is left unexplored by many other 
studies is the financial burden of post-harvest processing infrastructure. Although, in 
reality, these costs were much lower for the growers in this study, who received 
development assistance to build their beneficios and who had constructed them when 
cement (and probably labor) costs were much lower, constructing the same infrastructure 
now would account for at least a third of enterprise costs, not accounting for the costs of a 
loan (which are likely to be very high among these enterprises in these areas). Lyngbaek 
et al. (2001) expressed doubts that smallholders had significant fixed costs; the authors 
suggest that ICAFE’s estimation of fixed costs (29 percent of total costs) was not 
representative of smallholders. 
 Based on these budgets, organic growers would need to receive a premium of 
23.6 percent over mainstream prices to earn the same net income as conventional 
growers, which is lower than a similar figure calculated by Lyngbaek et al. (2001) (38 





 While this study focused on the contributions of coffee income to poverty 
alleviation, in reality, smallholder farming systems are diversified: all the coffee growers 
in this study also grew their own milpa (corn and sometimes beans) and some also grew 
cardamom. OG4 also grew bananas “commercially.” OG2 and OG3 both kept tilapia, 
although only OG3 sold tilapia for cash income. Outside of agriculture, CG3 owned a 
local store and OG4 operated a small gas-powered corn mill, where households would 
mill corn on a daily basis for tortillas, the major staple of the regional diet. The latter 
afforded him an additional Q50 per day. Some respondents were still dipping into savings 
from migration to United States for household consumption, although only OG2 currently 
received remittances from abroad. These activities could either increase household’s net 
income or “lower” the poverty line through cost-savings of subsistence production. There 
is also the possibility that they have a sapping effect household net income, for instance, 
if the inputs involved in milpa production are costlier than the cost-savings. A fuller 
analysis would take into consideration the budgets of these other activities, a daunting 
task. 
 Related to this, “households” did not actually reflect the 2-adult, 3-children 
estimate used for the poverty analysis. For OG1, the grower maintained his plot and his 
father’s plot, who was too old to farm. He also maintained his sister’s plot, who was 
enrolled as a female cooperative member, but who mainly worked within the home. He 
engaged in labor exchanges with his sister’s son, and all these family members lived 
within the same physical house, shared meals, etc., as well as used the same post-harvest 
 99 
 
processing infrastructure and truck. Disentangling these complex intra-household 
economics to arrive at a clear idea of the relationship between coffee income and poverty 
would be vexing, and made worse by the fact that there were probably also exchanges, 
although to a lesser degree, between OG1 and his brothers and sisters (and nephews), 
who also lived in the community and who were also members of the cooperative. OG2 
exchanged labor and shared infrastructure with his sons, who lived at home but owned 
separate plots. OG3 was no longer able to farm, due to a disability, so his sons, who had 
their own plots, maintained his plot. Likewise, this study does not differentiate between 
farmers who have more or less access to family labor (i.e. divide effective wage by 
number of working family members). It’s questionable how useful such a statistic would 
be, especially since some family members only help for certain activities. For instance, 
women might only invest their labor in coffee harvests and stirring coffee drying on 
patios. This division of labor would require a more complex equation for estimating 
effective wage.  
 Within the time and resource constraints of this study, we were only able to 
interview a limited number of farmers to achieve the level of detail presented above. Had 
farmer records been more detailed and comprehensive (and had farmer records been 
available for conventional growers), we might have been able to expand the study to 
more respondents. In our case, it would be more accurate to say that the records served as 
an aid for the interviews, since the data derived from records was often missing 
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information (sometimes an entire year’s-worth) and required extensive editing from 
smallholders22.  
 In a report on Rainforest Alliance-certified producers, evaluators found that 
certified producers were better at tracking financial data than noncertified producers. 
Certified producers are required to keep these records, and they receive technical 
assistance to facilitate such compliance. The study also claims that record-keeping 
promotes a “business-like regard” among producers and that it helps producers make 
“better financial decisions” (Beretta Cisneros & Jack, 2013, p. 8). While this might be the 
case, it is unclear how these changes in vision and decision-making were measured.  
Based on the quality of records data in this study, it was not immediately apparent 
that producers were using records as a tool for improving their own operations, and it 
seemed more likely that growers were simply maintaining records to comply with 
certification requirements. Due to these shortcomings, records among the growers in our 
study did not appear to be involved in the virtuous cycle of data quality and management 
improvements suggested by the Rainforest Alliance study. Is it possible that land, labor, 
credit and seasonal constraints severely limit the options for growers’ farming systems to 
the point where detailed record-keeping as a decision-making tool is much less useful 
here than in the context of developed country farming? 
                                                 





  The argument for improvements in the accuracy and precision of financial metrics 
at the farm-level is that benefits accrue both to farmer decision-making, as well as to the 
“bankability” of smallholders and their cooperatives (Beretta Cisneros & Jack, 2013, p. 
3). The Rainforest Alliance study recommends key indicators for bankability, or in other 
words, the data points that, if collected, could improve smallholders’ access to credit. 
This makes intuitive sense and further research could confirm the relationship between 
farm-level data collection and credit access. (The Rainforest Alliance study does not 
appear to differentiate between the data collection factors that promote credit access and 
other factors, such as participation in cooperatives.) Better budgetary data could also be 
of interest to researchers. Since this study witnessed a wide disparity between practices, 
yields, costs, family-labor days and economic consequences, it would be interesting (and 
useful) to identify which factors had the greatest marginal effect on yields and incomes. 
Training farmers in better record-keeping techniques could allow for such types of 
analysis (Conner & Rangarajan, 2009).  
Since the sample size is very small and geographically-specific, we cannot 
conclude generally that coffee incomes fall short of the poverty threshold at a regional 
level. The growers in this study could be on the under-endowed and under-performing 
side of the regional curve. To explore this a bit, we compared the organic growers in this 
study to other cooperative members, based on a data collected by cooperative extension 
agents in 2014. Plot sizes of cooperative members (N =1177) ranged from 0.13 to 5.38 
hectares, while the average was 1.10 hectares and the median was 0.89 hectares (Figure 
4.6.) (The average landholding among the 53 member from the community of Nueva 
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Esperanza, where this study was conducted, was slightly higher at 1.32 hectares.) Based 
on cooperative financial records (and assuming all members sold all their coffee to the 
cooperative), the average yield per member (N = 1190) was 1946 pounds. If we add 13 
“ghost” members with 1.10 hectares each, we can estimate that average productivity was 
1779.18 pounds per hectare.  
Compared to these figures, the organic growers in our study have more land 
access than the median cooperative grower and only OG1 had lower levels of 
productivity than the average cooperative grower. The average among the four growers is 
higher both in terms of land and productivity, and so it is possible that the growers in this 
study are performing better than a typical smallholder organic grower in the region. It is 
also possible that growers in other areas have suffered larger crop losses from coffee leaf 
rust. 
 
Figure 4.8. Number of members distributed across intervals of plot sizes (ha) (range of 






















 Related to the above, the selection of participants was left to the representative of 
the local faction of cooperative members. He selected family members, and growers with 
whom he was friendly. While working with this gatekeeper (and with the vetting of the 
cooperative) probably helped set our respondents at ease and allowed us to collect 
detailed data, it also likely exposed the data to selection bias. In the case of organic 
growers, it is possible that the most noteworthy growers were selected to participate, 
whereas the parameters for selecting conventional growers seemed to be that these were 
the most amenable to participation (i.e., were on good terms with the representative and 
the cooperative, in general). 
Finally, further research can strive to achieve this level of detail while improving 
upon the methods here to increase the accuracy and precision of coffee farming 
accounting data. First, costs related to land acquisition, loan servicing and participation in 
cooperative duties (i.e. opportunity costs incurred when attending cooperative 
workshops) decrease profits and merit inclusion into these types of analysis. 
Second, researchers could improve upon this study and previous research by 
collecting more accurate information on conventional growers’ yields, orchard 
establishment, amortization of first years’ maintenance costs, the ratio between family 
labor and contracted labor involved in harvests, post-harvest processing labor costs.  
 The impact of coffee leaf rust disease on the conventional growers’ yields made it 
nearly impossible for the research to compare the yields of organic and conventional 
growers. Besides, conventional yields were self-reported and so probably not as precise 
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as organic growers’ yields. Nevertheless, an effort was made, and the rate of conventional 
growers’ productivity was based on the last productivity rate recalled by CG2 before the 
onset of coffee leaf rust23. This value might be very conservative, considering that CG2 
perceived that conventional growers could reach about 4500 to 6000 pounds per 
hectare24. More research is needed on what are realistic productivity ranges for organic 
and conventional growers at this scale. For instance, OGs perceptions of feasible yields 
ranges appeared over-optimistic, since none of the growers were attaining such yields.  
On a similar note, OG1’s yields were noticeably affected by coffee leaf rust and 
yet they were kept in this analysis, while the crop losses for CGs (substantially greater) 
were effectively ignored. This was dealt with, to a certain extent, by disaggregating the 
analysis between low-performing and high-performing growers, but the averaged values 
are undermined by the inconsistent treatment of yields data between the two groups. 
More research is needed on the establishment costs for coffee farmers. Coffee leaf 
rust disease presents such a research opportunity since many growers are currently 
replanting their orchards. In this case, only one grower’s calculated establishment costs 
were extrapolated to other growers. A limitation here is that many cooperative growers 
(and possibly non-cooperative growers) have their own plant nurseries and propagate 
                                                 
23 It was also assumed that all the CGs could reach the same productivity level, despite having different-
sized plots. This is unlikely considering the effect of scale on productivity. There is also an implicit 
assumption here that to maintain this yield level, conventional growers’ will need to apply fungicides. 
However, if coffee leaf rust becomes less prevalent in the future, CGs might be able to attain these or 
higher yields, while also reducing their investments in disease control. Researchers should pay attention to 
these trends. 
24 Since it is unclear to what extent the costs of production would have to increase to achieve those yield 
markers, this study does not speculate on how profitable they would be. 
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their own plants, whereas this figure indicates the purchase of plants off-farm. A second 
shortcoming is that this figure does not allow us to separate labor costs into contracted 
and family labor.  
Only weeding costs are used to estimate and amortize the first years’ production 
costs (since we assumed that harvests do not begin until the fourth year). The operational 
assumptions here are that there is little shade maintenance during these years, plants are 
too small for serious pruning, and (if fallow land was converted for orchard 
establishment) soils could be relatively new and fertile, so fertilizer applications are 
minimal or zero. Extrapolating current weeding costs to first years’ production costs, 
however, could be problematic if it misses other early practices. Additionally, this study 
did not account for potentially lower costs of labor at the time of establishment, although 
growers had noted that wages have increased substantially over the last five years. It is 
unclear whether they increased more than the normal rate of inflation. 
Harvest costs are likely slightly higher than those estimated here. Growers use 
mules or horses to transport harvested coffee between the plot and the post-harvest 
processing site. The cost of maintaining a pack animal are not included (pack animals are 
used for other activities (including other coffee practices) and it would be hard to separate 
out use costs without specific time records). During especially large harvests pack 
animals might be rented or a worker might be paid a wage premium for bringing their 
own pack animal and transporting harvested coffee. The interviews do not provide 
enough detail to determine when such rental fees or wage premiums were being paid. 
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Such costs are expected to be relatively small compared to other cost categories and to 
overall profitability.  
Comparing the cooperative’s estimates for post-harvest processing infrastructure 
and estimates provided by growers, it would appear that cooperative figures might be a 
bit inflated (the costs provided by growers are reported in Appendix F). Determining an 
accurate depreciation rates for post-harvest processing infrastructure based on grower 
responses was complicated for several reasons: 
1. The interviews did not produce a consistent idea of how long these infrastructure 
components last. 
2. Infrastructure had been built in different years and, according to OG1, the cost of 
some materials does not seem to have risen consistently alongside normal rates of 
inflation.  
3. Some growers had received assistance for building components of their 
infrastructure through a development project. 
4. Growers were recalling costs of construction from more than a decade in the past 
and so the accuracy of their recall over that timeframe is brought into question. 
Additionally, for the purposes of this study, we attribute the costs of this infrastructure to 
each respondent’s plots, although many of our organic producers shared their beneficios 
with other family members who owned separate plots.  
In this study, we applied five family labor-days for post-harvest processing to all 
growers, but this value probably will vary according to the size of harvests, the number of 
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harvests, the type of post-harvest processing infrastructure, and whether or not labor is 
contracted for these activities.  
Although we attributed the transport fee charged by local drivers, two of our 
respondents had their own truck. Incorporating exact transportation costs into budgets 
would be incredibly difficult. First, depreciation rates and repairs for trucks were not used 
due to the difficulty in separating a figure for coffee transport and other uses of the truck. 
Also, these growers might carry coffee for other family members’ plots or other local 
growers, offsetting the own transportation costs that can be attributed to their plot.  
 Outside of these categories, there were a few pivotal figures that should be 
verified by future research, particularly the productive life spans of different varieties of 
coffee plants, conversion rate from cuerdas to hectares and the conversion from the 
weight of parchment coffee (used for OG yields) back to coffee cherries (i.e. harvest 
weight). In this study, we assumed that 20 years was the productive lifespan of the plant, 
and used this to amortize orchard establishment and first years’ production costs25. In 
reality, the productive life of the plot would be expected to vary considerably due to 
several factors, including plant variety, agroecological and climatic conditions, and 
management.  
Anecdotally, it seemed that the measurements of a cuerda varied across regions. 
The cooperative’s conversion rate was used here, but this should be verified through plot 
                                                 
25 According to the FAO, coffee production will drop after six or seven years, unless the coffee plant 
receives a heavy “re-juvenation” pruning (Winston et al., 2005); however, it is not clear how long a single 




measurement. If there are actually fewer cuerdas per hectare, the yields here might be 
inflated. 
Labor is paid according to harvest weight, but here yields data was based on 
records of parchment weight. Estimating labor costs required the use of conversion ratio 
between parchment and coffee cherries. This study used 1:5.1, as explained above. But 
this appears to vary among growers’ records (possibly related to altitude). Since growers 
can record coffee harvest weight prior to pulping, better record-keeping would have 
contributed more precise data in this category. It would be difficult for research to 
capture such precision without relying on farmer records. 
 The poverty line was another figure that could be problematized, since it is 
unclear whether a national poverty threshold is universal and applicable across rural and 
urban contexts and conditions to conditions. As was pointed out above, many households 
produce their own staples and so these cost-savings could “lower” the poverty threshold, 
although one should be cautious about overestimating these contributions.  
There are a number of issues in using traditional poverty lines as a proxy for 
poverty itself. First, poverty lines tend to focus on the material dimensions of poverty, 
whereas poverty also manifests in “non-material, psychosocial and environmental 
dimensions” (UN DESA, 2010, p. 45) and in non-monetary indicators, such as access to 
basic public services (World Bank, 2015). In general, developing countries have fallen 
behind developed countries in developing more holistic and subjective measures of 
poverty, relying instead on traditional absolute poverty lines (UN DESA, 2010). Whereas 
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capability approaches (Sen, 1999, as cited in UN DESA, 2010) have addressed some of 
these issues, they still might fall short of adequately defining poverty. More recently, 
authors have used counting multidimensional methodologies to quantify these indicators 
and generate multidimensional poverty thresholds (Ayuya et al., 2015), and these could 
potentially be useful for further analysis of organic coffee production. 
Analysts have raised concerns that the World Bank’s per-day poverty lines 
underestimate poverty thresholds. In addition, these lines tend to neglect price differences 
between rural and urban settings, and presumably between central and remote locations. 
In our case, the national poverty and dollar-a-day thresholds were very similar. A key 
methodological problem undermining the validity of poverty lines is the reliance on costs 
for “optimal” caloric intake: these analyses tend to discount the socio-cultural factors that 
guide food choices, such that actual food costs are higher, and also tend to neglect the 
higher caloric demands for those engaged in physical labor (eg. farmers) (UN DESA, 
2010, p. 50). Determining a cost threshold for non-food basic needs is even more 
complicated (and inherently less valid) because it does not rely on the “scientific” basis 
of calories that food costs can claim. Many times non-food basic needs costs are estimate 
as a percentage of food costs or thresholds are assumed from expenditures of households 
who attain the food poverty line, without verifying that all of households’ non-food basic 
needs are being met. In some cases, educational and health expenditures have not been 
counted as non-food basic needs (UN DESA, 2010). 
 What implications can be drawn from these limitations? As witnessed in this 
study, it is incredibly difficult to re-create very precise enterprise budgets as a tool to 
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compare performance between farmers and groups of farmers. It is equally difficult to 
create enough of these budgets to be able to generalize to larger populations. Considering 
this, there is probably a "threshold" beyond which the specificity of budget data does not 
add much marginal value to its subsequent applications.  
That is not to write-off these attempts at accounting completely. Validity and 
reliability could be attained by collecting basic budgetary data in large-scale surveys, and 
followed by the collection of more in-depth data through small, randomized samples. For 
instance, the survey could ask whether growers use their own vehicle or pay for transport, 
while the in-depth interview could be committed to arriving at a more accurate figure of 
truck depreciation attributed to coffee. The latter would then be extrapolated. Better 
record-keeping would be enormously. 
CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSIONS 
 Among the first study’s respondents, organic growers did not achieve a coffee 
income at or above the national poverty line. However, there was wide variation in levels 
of profitability among these few growers, and in some cases, growers could come very 
close to the poverty line at existing plot sizes, prices and productivity levels. Organic 
growers did not appear to perform substantially better than their conventional 
counterparts, in terms of profitability, and so the incentive for organic production and 




 Is there a need for diversification among these growers? It would appear that for 
some, small increases in productivity, prices or plot sizes would lift them above the 
poverty line. For others, the necessary improvements to productivity and prices, or the 
necessary expansions, appear to be unfeasible. In these cases, alternative income sources 
could be employed to make up the shortfall between coffee incomes and the poverty. 
Unfortunately, this study did not measure contributions to smallholder incomes from pre-
existing non-coffee activities, so it cannot be concluded here that those growers with 
apparent income gaps should pursue even more alternatives. And, as mentioned above, 
income is not a proxy for welfare, so analyses based only on income have limited 
explanatory power. 
 As the second study shows, the contributions of diversification, in general, were 
limited among coffee growers. In addition, there was little prevalence of potentially 
profitable alternatives, such as honey and domestic industry. Cardamom and milpa 
production were prevalent, but – at least in the case of cardamom – returns over 
production costs were perceived to be small and unreliable. Although milpa production 
offers cost-savings, as well as less quantifiable benefits (i.e. food security and 
sovereignty), it is unclear whether households produce their own staples at a net gain or 
loss. 
 One reason for this limited application of diversification strategies appeared to be 
the resounding confidence in coffee as a future and primary source of cash income, and 
the basis for attaining a household’s goals. Risk management as a driver of diversification 
received scant mention. This is interesting considering that most advocates of 
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diversification have focused on the vulnerability of smallholder coffee farmers. Many 
respondents suggested the income-smoothing was the major objective in growing 
cardamom, and seasonality is certainly an aspect of vulnerability. And in some cases, 
diversification was used as a strategy to optimize resources. Non- or sub-economic 
factors also appeared to weigh on decisions regarding diversification including economic 
ideology, future aspirations (including the primacy of children’s education), familiarity 
with processes, social capital and influences on motivations by external actors.  
 Since growers continue to perceive coffee production as the most reliable 
livelihood strategy to attain their own aspirations, recommendations regarding alternative 
activities should take into account the impact the new activity would have on labor and 
resources currently committed to coffee production. Ignoring coffee production, could 
lead to poor adoption rates, if the new activity conflicts in some way with current 
practices. Interventions might want to focus on providing extensive oversight and support 
to a smaller number of beneficiaries to ensure their success. Later, these producers would 
serve as examples for the rest of the community, and the community can become familiar 
with the activity at their own pace. 
 There might also be creative solutions for perceived skills gaps. At this point, 
respondents appear to believe that “skills” can only be obtained and verified through 
formal educational institutions, which are usually based at a distance from growers. This 
is probably true: even Barillas offers limited options for high school graduates, who must 
travel to Huehuetenango (the Department seat) on the weekends to attend university. In 
addition, these institutions require completion a multi-year programs. However, would it 
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be possible to offer more targeted, short-term training in specific skills? Would it be 
possible to offer this training in the community to address geographical immobility? How 
would these trainings be certified in a way that makes them acceptable to potential 
employers? 
 Further research should determine the potential for improving returns to 
cardamom production through organic certification and cooperative marketing. There is 
very little literature on this topic, and a comprehensive market study would only serve the 
cooperative well, but could be of use outside the region. An evaluation of the returns to 
existing honey production should also be conducted, as well as the size of honey markets 
and their ability to absorb new producers, and this information should be provided to 
local producers. The cooperative might also investigate the feasibility of commercial 
vegetable, black pepper, and Robusta coffee production and oversee small experimental 
sites with these products.  
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CHAPTER 6: LESSONS LEARNED 
 
 In my estimation, this research fell far short of a comprehensive understanding of 
both the need for and the current uses of diversification among smallholder coffee 
farmers. In part, this was due to issues with how the research rolled out, and also to a lack 
of planning for these issues. Originally, I had intended to present quantitative data on the 
prevalence and extent of diversification, and then qualify or expand upon the quantitative 
results with an analysis of qualitative data. These types of data were to be collected, first, 
through a survey with a relatively large and representative sample size that had already 
been planned to be conducted as part of the larger project. The survey would include 
questions related to income sources and amount of income provided by each source, as 
well as some questions collecting open-ended, though brief responses. After a 
preliminary review of the survey data, I would construct a guide for in-depth interviews 
that would seek to collect more information on apparent patterns. These interviews would 
provide rich, qualitative data that could expand upon or qualify the survey data. 
 Unfortunately, for the sake of brevity presumably, the survey questions were 
amended so that they no longer included questions relevant to income diversification in 
the way I had planned to analyze it. In addition, there were delays in implementing the 
survey, such that it was not administered in time for me to construct the in-depth 
interview guides from the data as initially planned. Also, by the time I became aware of 
these changes, I was already at the half-way point for my time in Guatemala.  
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 During the first half of my time in Guatemala, I conducted interviews that sought 
to a) gather context, b) collect cost of production information for alternative crops and c) 
trial qualitative questions that might be included in later in-depth interviews. I was 
hesitant to include quantitative questions that would be repeated in later surveys, out of 
consideration for producers’ (and my own) time. For these reasons, the interview guides 
were edited frequently, and since the subjects of these interviews were so broad, the 
responses lacked qualitative depth. However, due to issues related to the survey data, 
these interviews came to be the main data source for my thesis. 
 Several lessons emerged here. The first is that I should have been in closer contact 
(“in the loop”) with the research team. If I had anticipated the changes to the survey 
earlier, I might have planned a smaller survey that included the quantitative income 
diversification component, and spent the rest of my time administering a single survey in 
various communities. The second is that I should have developed an alternative research 
plan before going to Guatemala in anticipation of obstacles more generally. Since my 
data collection period was more time-constrained than it would have been had I been 
conducting research locally in the United States, the need for a back-up plan was more 
pressing. While I did attempt to develop such a plan “on-site,” this was made difficult by 
the fact that I had decided to go in a different direction, and this required me to devote 
more time to planning and less to data collection. It was also made difficult by frustration 
and stress, and an undermining feeling of being lost, ill-prepared and inexperienced, with 
less recourse to advice than I would have had in the States during the academic year. The 
second dataset was the outcome of that effort. 
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 In general, I feel as if I approached this research with a too feeble grasp on the 
literature and a too limited understanding of the current and pressing research questions 
related to the social science surrounding smallholder coffee production. In lieu of being 
“handed” these research questions by faculty, a helpful activity would have been to 
determine two to three pressing questions related to this topic through a thorough review 
of the literature, instead of starting with a topic-oriented approach (in this case, that topic 
was “livelihood diversification”). A literature review is an obvious expectation, but I 
should have set for myself the goal of defining pertinent research questions, and then 
validating those questions with my advisers, before moving onto topic area and 
methodology, and before leaving country. With this focus in mind, things might not have 
unraveled as much as they did. 
 The final lesson that emerged is that my approach did not fully consider the ways 
in which the research could be participatory and action-oriented. In the end, it was 
neither. I gained a full appreciation of the level of careful (and time-consuming) planning 
that is required to do real participatory action-oriented research (PAR). Three months is 
hardly enough time to implement a PAR process, but it could be enough time to learn and 
practice a piece of that process. In this case, it was a missed opportunity, both because of 
planning and inexperience. Since the application of PAR in rural development in Central 
America, rather than the relationship between sustainable agriculture and ecosystems, is 
my main interest, ideally my approach to intellectual and professional development 
would have been to participate in a PAR process alongside an experienced facilitator as 
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an apprentice. In contrast, the thesis here is the result of falling back into a more 
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APPENDIX A: Interview Guide No. 1 
Sección 1: Guía General 
 
1. Cuantos años lleva cultivando café? 
2. Cuantas cuerdas de café tiene su familia? 
3. En los últimos años ha aumentado o reducido su cuerdas de café o quedo lo mismo? 
4. Cuales productos cultivan para la venta? 
5. Cuando empezó a cultivarlo?  
6. Por cuales razones empezó a cultivarlo? 
7. Desde empezó a cultivarlo, ha sembrado mas?  
8. Cuanto área tiene en producción de esto cultivo? 
9. Que necesitaba hacer o gastar para empezar con el cultivo? 
10. Que estaba en este lugar antes de cultivar esto cultivo? 
11. En el año pasado, que actividades o practicas ha hecho para este cultivo, quien las hizo, cuando las 
hizo y cuanta tiempo demoran hacerlas? 
12. Tenia que comprar un producto para aplicar en el cultivo o pagar mano de obra? Cuanto le cobraron? 
13. En el año pasado, cuando cosecho? Cuanto produjo de esto cultivo?  
14. Como cambia la cosecha cada año? Cuales factores especificos tienen un impacto en la cosecha? 
15. En el año pasado, donde se vendio? A que precio? Cuanto costo el traslado al mercado?  
16. Como cambian los precios para este cultivo con el tiempo? 
17. En los próximos cinco años, intenta seguir cultivándolo? Intenta disminuir o expandir la producción? 
Por que? 
18. Si va a expandir, piensa comprar mas terreno nuevo o convertir otro terreno que ya tiene?  
19. Cuales son algunos aspectos positivos de este cultivo? 
20. Cuales son algunos aspectos negativos de este cultivo? 
21. Hay gente que tiene mucho éxito con este cultivo? Por que? 
22. Como compara este cultivo con el café? 
23. Como ha sido el impacto de cultivarlo en su familia? 
24. Hay otros cultivos o productos para la venta que se puede producir por aqui? 
25. Ha pensado en cultivar estos? Por que le interesa o no le interesa? 
26. En el año pasado, sembro maíz o frijol? 
27. Por cuales razones usa parte de su terreno para maíz o frijol? Por que en vez de café u otro cultivo? 
28. En el año pasado, que actividades o practicas ha hecho para este cultivo, quien las hizo, cuando las 
hizo y cuanta tiempo demoran hacerlas? 
29. Tenia que comprar un producto para aplicar en el cultivo o pagar mano de obra? Cuanto le cobraron? 
30. En el año pasado, cuando cosecho? Cuanto produjo de esto cultivo?  
31. Como cambia la cosecha cada año? Cuales factores especificos tienen un impacto en la cosecha? 
32. Cuantos libras de maíz consume su familia cada semana? 
33. Cuando termino consumir el maíz de cada cosecha? 
Sección II: Fuera de finca/No-agricola 
1. En el año pasado, busco trabajo fuera de la finca algún miembro de la familia? 
2. Donde encontraron empleo, como encontró allí y cuando trabajaba por allí? 
3. Cuanto contribuyo al ingreso familiar y como se uso este dinero? 
4. En los últimos años donde consiguió trabajo? 
5. En el próximo año, piensa buscar más trabajo fuera de la finca? Donde piensa buscar? 
6. Cuales son algunos aspectos positivos de este trabajo? 
7. Cuales son algunos aspectos negativos de este trabajo? 
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8. Como ha sido el impacto de este trabajo en su familia? 
 
APPENDIX B: Interview Guide No. 2 
 
Estoy estudiando el tema de ingresos entre productores de café. Yo he visto que, por aquí, la mayoría de 
productores no solo producen café, pero hacen muchas otras cosas para ganar ingresos y sostener la vida de 
sus familias, especialmente con las perdidas que causo la Roya. El proposito de esta entrevista es entender 
que varias cosas hacen las familias y por que las hacen. 
Su participación en esta entrevista es completamente voluntaria. A cualquier momento, usted tiene el derecho 
de no contestar una respuesta o terminar la entrevista. Su consentimiento de participar en esta investigación 
se implica por su participación en la entrevista hasta el fin. 
 
Nombre y Apellido  
Comunidad  
1. Cuantos años lleva como socio de Asobagri?  
2. Cuantos años lleva cultivando el café?  
3. Cuantos miembros de su familia viven en su hogar?  
4. Cuanto terreno tiene en total?  
5. En el año pasado, alquiló terreno? Si   /   No 
6. Cuanto terreno?  
7. Qué tipos de cultivos y bestias tiene en su finca actualmente? 









      
      
      
      
      
      
      
8. Por cual motivocultiva cada de estos cultivos?  
9. Cual de estos cultivos es lo mas importante a su familia?Por que?  
10. Cual es mas rentable?Por que?  
11. Por que no cultivar solamente café?  
12. Es una forma de ingreso seguro el café?  
13. Como mantiene su nivel de vida con el tiempo si el café no es seguro?  
14. En el año pasado, algun miembro de su familia hizo algo en la casa para vender? Si   /   No 
15. Que hizo?  
16. Desde cuando hace esto?  
17. Como ayudo a su familia este ingreso?  
18. En el año pasado, alguien en su familia trabajó fuera de la finca? Si   /   No 
19. En que tipo trabajo?  
20. Desde cuando trabaja allí?  
21. Donde?  
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22. Cuando en el año?  
23. Por quebusco o no busco trabajo fuera de la finca?  
24. Como ayudo este ingreso a su familia?  
25. Con esta persona fuera de la finca, se limita su habilidad a cultivar sus productos?  
26. Tiene un familiar que vive y trabaja en otra parte? Si   /   No 
27. Desde cuando están alla? Si   /   No 
28. Que necesitaba hacer o gastar para facilitar su viaje?  
29. Ellos mandan dinero  para apoyar a la familia?  
30. Que impacto tiene este dinero en la familia?  
31. Que impacto tiene en como manejas su finca?  
32. En los años pasados, vendio su familia algo para ganar dinero?  
33. Que vendio?  
34. Cuando?  
35. Como gasto este dinero?  
40. En los  ultimos años, tenia alguna otra forma de ingreso que todavía no ha mencionado? 
36. En los últimos años, compro algo para mejorar su ingreso?  
37. Que compro?  
38. Cuando?  
39. Como ha mejorado su ingreso?  
Si   
/   
N
o 
41. Cuando empezó?  
42. Todavia sigue haciéndolo? Si   /   No 
43. En el pasado, tenia otra forma de ingreso que no aprovecha ahora?  
44. Por que dejo de hacerlo?  
45. En general, que necesita ahora su familia para mejorar sus ingresos?  
46. Le interesa tener otras formas de ingreso?  
47. Cuales?  
48. Que se necesita para realizar estos ingresos?  
49. En los últimos años el clima ha cambiado por aquí? Si   /   No 
50. En que sentido ha cambiado?  
51. Como afecta la cosecha de café estos cambios?  
52. Quedara apta esta zona para el café en el futuro?  
53. Como ha cambiado sus practicas para adaptar a estos cambios?  
54. Como piensas cambiar sus practicas en el futuro?  
55. Como afecto su finca la Roya?  
56. Cuando empezó a afectar su finca?  
57. Como aseguraba que tenia suficiente ingreso al frente de estas perdidas?  
58. Usted o alguien en su familia vivía y trabajaba en otra parte para un tiempo? Si   /   No 
59. Que necesitaba hacer o gastar para llegar allí?  
60. Cuando regreso aquí, como gasto el dinero que gano allí?  
 
APPENDIX C: Interview Guide No. 3 
 
“Estoy estudiando el tema de ingresos entre productores de café. Yo he visto que, por aquí, la mayoría de 
productores no solo producen café, pero hacen muchas otras cosas para ganar ingresos y sostener la vida de 
sus familias, especialmente con las perdidas que causo la Roya. El proposito de esta entrevista es entender 
que varias cosas hacen las familias y por que las hacen. 
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Su participación en esta entrevista es completamente voluntaria. A cualquier momento, usted tiene el 
derecho de no contestar una respuesta o terminar la entrevista. Su consentimiento de participar en esta 
investigación se implica por su participación en la entrevista hasta el fin.” 
Nombre y Apellido  
Comunidad  
1. Empezamos por hablar un poco de su familia. Cuantos son? Que hacen ustedes? Todos viven 
aquí? 
2. Cuanto tiempo lleva produciendo café? Como ayuda a su familia la producción de café? Quien 
participa en la producción? 
 
3. Cuando empezo a anotar los efectos de la Roya en su finca? 
4. Cuales eran los efectos de la Roya en su finca? Que pensaba cuando anotó estos cambios? 
5. Como cambio sus cosechas de café la Roya? 
6. Ahora como es el estado de la Roya en su finca? 
 
7. Cambio la vida de su familia la Roya? En que sentido?  
8. Cuando perdió en las cosechas y faltaba ingreso esperado, como mantenía suficiente dinero o 
come recupero dinero? Para cada estrategia: como logro a hacerlo o por que no lo hizo? 
 
a.  Dependía en otros tipos de ingresos que ya hacia?  
b. Sembró más mipla que antes  
c. Venta de algo, animales o terreno  
d. Otras formas de trabajo: fuera de la finca, migración  
e. Usó dinero que tenia ahorrado  
f. Prestamo del banco, amigos o familiaries, o de otras instituciones  
g. Un apoyo del gobierno o otras instituciones?  
9. Su familia siente menos seguro con sus ingresos después de la incidencia de la Roya? 
10. Siente que el café es menos seguro que antes ahora? Piensa sembrar menos café por la incidencia 
de la Roya? Por que o por que no? 
11. Que es más importante para su familia ahora: aumentar su ingreso oa segurar su ingreso?  
12. Como piensa cambiar su vida después de su experiencia con la Roya? 
13.  Como piensa reducir el impacto de eventos como la Roya en el futuro? 
14. Piensa que ser socio de ASOBAGRI tenia un efecto en como respondio a la Roya? 
 
15. En los últimos años ha comprado algo para mejorar o asegurar sus ingresos?  
16. En general, que necesita ahora su familia para mejorar sus ingresos?  
17. Si el dinero falta, puede sacar un préstamo para esto? Por que o por que no?  
18. Le interesa tener otras formas de ingreso? Cuales? Que se necesita para realizar estos ingresos?  
Preguntas demográficos 
 
     Cuanto terreno tiene en total?  
     Alquila terreno? Cuantas cuerdas?  
     Cuantas cuerdas de café tiene?  
     Cuantas cuerdas de milpa?  
     Estime su ingreso familiar en un año normal.  
     Cuantas personas viven en su casa?  







APPENDIX D: Grower Histories 
 Grower history 
OG1 Ladino. Inherited his coffee plot from his father in 2000. His father initially owned a farm in Jua (southwest of Nueva 
Esperanza), but fled under the threat of violence from guerrilleros and began working on the plantation below Nueva 
Esperanza until he had saved enough to buy a higher-altitude, unused piece of the plantation at a discounted price from 
his employer. 
OG2 Ladino. Worked on coffee plantations since he was 20 years old. Began producing coffee on his own when he purchased 
this plot in 1981.  
OG3 Ladino. He worked in Barillas (a nearby rural town) before purchasing his land here in 1989 at Q50 per cuerda.  
OG4 Ladino. Born in Quiché, where his father was a manager or supervisor (“corporal”) on a large coffee plantation. His 
father’s position put their household at risk of guerrilla violence during the Civil War and their family fled to this locale, 
where his father found work on the plantation below Nueva Esperanza. He purchased his large landholding in 1999 at 
Q180,000 while he was still working as a laborer in the United States. 
CG1 Indigenous. Migrated to work on large coffee plantations near the coast until household was able to purchase current 
landholding. Larger coffee plot recently abandoned due to effect of coffee leaf rust. Purchased his landholding in 1988 at 
Q200 per cuerda. 
CG2 Indigenous. Born to laborers on the large coffee plantation below Nueva Esperanza and worked as an agricultural laborer 
until household was able to purchase current landholding. Purchased study plot in 2013 at Q1,800 per cuerda. 




APPENDIX E: Organic and Conventional Smallholder Practices and Anacafé Recommendations 
 
 Organic growers Conventional growers and Anacafé Recommendations 
Weeding Manual weeding, requiring payment of contracted labor, three to 
four times per year. 
CG1 had tried using a glyphosate herbicide for the past two years, but 
indicated that he would probably return to manual weeding. It was 
unclear whether this was for economic reasons or disappointment with 
the results of herbicide application. CG3 also mentioned using 
glyphosate, although he said this was rare and mainly to control for 
coffee leaf rust, and that the results were disappointing. 
CG2 stayed with manual weeding, four times a year. 
 
Anacafé, in general, recommends controlling weeds manually (with 
machete). If Glifosato is used, they are recommending only 1 
application per year at a dosage of ½ liter per manzana (commercial 
recommendations are for 1 liter per manzana). This was calculated at 
40 to 60 cc per backpack sprayer. 
Pruning Pruning of coffee plants and removal of suckers, usually twice a 
year. 




Once or twice a year. Once per year. 
Soil conservation The two common practices are terracing and barriers.  
 
Terraces are either individual (per plant) or continuous (entire 
row). Re-dug every 2 to 4 years. 
 
Not all producers were using barriers. OG2 indicated that barriers 
were only necessary on very steep plots. OG3 said they were not 
necessary since he had terraces (and barriers rob nutrients from the 
coffee plant) 
Neither CG1 nor CG2 used live barriers or terraces, currently. CG1 
had applied terracing and barriers on a separate coffee plot, but that 
coffee plot has now been abandoned because of coffee leaf rust. On 
CG2’s plot, previous owners had made terraces, but he had not as yet 
renovated them. 
 







Compost, produced domestically from coffee pulp, leaf litter, 
banana trunks, green organic material, ashes, and fertile soil. 
Manure is added occasionally, but OG1 did not use manure 
because they do not produce enough. Applied at base of plant or in 
cajuelas. OGs application rates ranged from 0.5 to 5 pounds per 
tree with an application frequency ranging from every 4 to 6 years 
Granulated chemical fertilizers applied at the base of tree, one (CG1) 
to three (CG3) times per year. The amount of fertilizer used did seem 










(smallholders typically only fertilize a portion of their plot every 
year), so that average application rates were between 0.1 and 1.25 
pounds per tree per year. 
OG1 had also begun to add agua miel, or run-off from the 
fermentation process. 
 
Three of the OGs had only recently begun using lime, while OG3 
applies lime every other year. Applications ranged from 3 – 16 
ounces per tree. 
 
At the time of the interviews (July, 2015), some growers were just 
beginning to apply Ferticonsa (a brand of decomposed chicken 
manure), which had been recently approved for organic 
production. 
All three CGs also used a foliar fertilizer, which they mixed with 
fungicide in the backpack sprayer. CG3 said that Anacafé 
recommended this practice. 
 
Anacafe recommends a variety of chemical fertilizers; however, the 
extension agent noted that 15-15-15 was commonly recommended 
only for young plants. To optimize the effectiveness of fertilizers, it 
was recommended that producers apply complete NPK formulas (ex., 
21-7-14) twice per year, the first in May or June and the second in 
August and September. Another application of fertilizers without 
phosphorous (ex. 20-0-20 or 19-0-27) was recommended for October 
or November to increase harvest yields. 
 
Pest and disease 
management 
The cooperative had begun to produce and sell its own organic 
biological controls for coffee leaf rust, “Adios Roya,” which 
included a commercial product called Royano. (They were also 
producing a foliar fertilizer, “Bonasobagri,” which included a 
commercial product called Bonasol.) Growers had just recently 
begun applying these products (in 2015), so it was too soon to 
measure the results. Previously, the growers interviewed did not 
use inputs to control for coffee leaf rust. OG1 had used Adios Roya 
on his father’s plot and thought that it was working. OG4 had also 
used it. OG3 mentioned that his variety of coffee was resistant to 
coffee leaf rust. 
 
Ojo de gallo, another common coffee disease, is controlled by 
decreasing shade. OG1 mentioned that lime also helps defend 
against this disease. 
 
Broca, a common insect pest, has not been a major issue, and is 
sometimes controlled manually (removing infested coffee 
cherries). 
Alto Diez (fungicide) and an adjudant sprayed for control of coffee 
leaf rust, three (CG1) to five (CG3) times per year. Alto Diez was 
recommended by Anacafé in dosages of 300 – 350 cc per manzana, 
according to the incidence and severity of the disease. The extension 
agent calculated that this was equivalent to 25 cc per cuerda for adult 
plants.  
 
No other pests or diseases controlled for at the time of the study. 
 
Anacafé recommends using a varied regimen of products for disease 
control to avoid the possibility of Roya adapting to any one control. 
These include both systemic and contact products. The latter group 
would include copper sulfate which is used more as a preventive than 
a fungicide proper and would be applied during the dry season (March 
through May). Three (or four, at the very maximum) sprayings are 
recommended per year. 
 
The Anacafe extension agent that Andrew spoke with mentioned that 
he had also experimented with ASOBAGRI’s “Adios Roya,” but 
found that it had very limited control (he estimated 50 percent) 





Mainly cement fermentation tanks, washing channels and patios 
(OG3 had returned to drying on wooden trays). 
 
All had received materials to build cement fermentation tanks 
through a cooperative project that was funded externally. 
CG1 and CG2 fermented in wooden boxes and dried on wooden trays. 
CG3 had a cement fermentation tank and washing channel, but tried 




APPENDIX F: Post-Harvest Infrastructure Data from Interviews 







OG1     
     pulper and drum Q3,600 2008 10 years Q360 
     fermentation tanks Q5,000 2007   
     patio -- -- -- -- 
     
OG2     
     pulper Q1,500 1992   
     fermentation tank Q400 1992   
     washing channel Q1,500 1992   
     patio Q3,000 1993   
     
OG3     
     pulper Q7,500 2002 20 years Q375 
     washing channel Q15,000 2001   
     drying trays (wooden)    Q1,500 
     
OG4     
     pulper Q2,000 2000 10 – 15 years Q200 
     pulper drum Q800  3 – 6 years Q40 
     motor Q2,900 2007   
     motor repairs    Q250 – 650  
     fermentation tanks -- 2007 -- -- 
     washing channel Q3,800 2007 10 years Q380 
     patio Q12,000 2010   
     
CG1     
     pulper (hand-crank) Q2,500 2000   
     fermentation boxes (wooden)    Q150 
     drying trays (wooden)    Q600 
     
CG2     
     pulper Q3,000 2013   
     fermentation boxes (wooden)    -- 
     drying trays (wooden)    -- 
     
CG3     
     pulper Q3,800 2000   
     fermentation tanks, washing 
channel and roof 
Q7,000 2007   
     drying trays Q2400  2 years Q1200 
Note. OG1 could not remember how much the patio cost and it was impossible to estimate based on his 
interview. Fermentation tanks were constructed through a project managed by the cooperative with 
support from USAID. Producers received cement and blocks, while they provided their own labor, 
sand/gravel and the cost of a mason’s services. OG5 received the materials for fermentation tanks 








APPENDIX H: Post-Harvest Infrastructure Cost Estimates from Cooperative Staff 
Item Cost per unit (2015 USD) Quantity Cost (USD 2015) Longevity (years) Annual costs  
De-pulping      
     New pulper $603.22 1 $603.22 10 $60.32 
     New drum $60.32 1 $60.32 5 $12.06 
     Repairs $13.40  $13.40 1 $13.40 
     Motor $670.24  $670.24 5 $134.05 
     Repairs $40.21  $40.21 1 $40.21 
     Oil $13.40  $13.40 1 $13.40 
Fermentation tank (1 tank per 6000 pounds of production)   
     Bags of cement $10.99 6 $65.95 6 $10.99 
     Cement blocks $0.67 65 $43.57 6 $7.26 
     Sand/stone (including transport) $80.43 1 $80.43 6 $13.40 
     General labor costs $8.04 6 $48.26 6 $8.04 
     Builder labor costs $10.72 6 $64.34 6 $10.72 
Cement washing channel      
     Bags of cement $10.99 8 $87.94 6 $14.66 
     Cement blocks $0.67 100 $67.02 6 $11.17 
     Sand/stone (including transportation) $107.24 1 $107.24 6 $17.87 
     Cost of general labor $8.04 6 $48.26 6 $8.04 
     Cost of builder labor $10.72 6 $64.34 6 $10.72 
Cement drying patio      
     Bags of cement $10.99 40 $439.68 6 $73.28 
     Cement blocks $0.67 70 $46.92 6 $7.82 
     Sand/stone (including transportation) $536.19 1 $536.19 6 $89.37 
     Cost of general labor $8.04 20 $160.86 6 $26.81 
     Cost of builder labor $10.72 20 $214.48 6 $35.75 
Total   $3,476.27  $619.37 
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